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INTRODUCTION
Petitioner injured his arm at work in 1983, and has required approximately thirty
related surgeries since then totaling over $200,000.00, all of which were paid by
Respondents. In 1987, Petitioner was assigned a rating of 14% whole person impairment,
but was recently rated at 44% whole person impairment, secondary to his worsening
industrial injuries. Acting pro se, Petitioner filed an application for hearing, and asked for
an increased impairment rating, and to increase his compensation rate.
At the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) asked Petitioner about his
increased impairment rating claim, but did not ask about Petitioner's claim for increased
compensation rate claim. The ALJ granted Petitioner's increased compensation rate
claim and Respondents appealed. Petitioner filed an affidavit that showed his entitlement
to a higher compensation rate, with corresponding paystubs - the same evidence that
Petitioner would have produced at the hearing had he been prompted by the Judge. The
Commission reversed the ALJ's award of increased compensation rate. It concluded that
Petitioner had waived his claim, and that the ALJ had addressed Petitioner's claim sua
sponte. The Commission also refused to consider Petitioner's affidavit and paystubs.
This case is about fundamental fairness for pro se litigants before the Labor
Commission, and turns on two related issues. First, whether Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b8(1) required the ALJ to ask Petitioner if he had any evidence on issues that were joined
in the pleadings, and if not, whether the Petitioner's failure to interject unsolicited
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evidence into the hearing amounted to a waiver of his claim. Second, where the
Petitioner supplied sworn testimony and exhibits that show his entitlement to benefits to
the Commission, whether the Commission abused its discretion when it refused to
consider that evidence as the ultimate finder of fact.
This Court should reverse the Commission, and grant Petitioner's increased
compensation rate, awarding him previously underpaid monies and interest. It should
hold that Petitioner raised his claim in the pleadings, and therefore, the ALJ did not
address that claim sua sponte. This Court should also hold that Petitioner did not waive
that claim at the hearing, especially where the ALJ never asked about the claim.
Finally, this Court should also hold that the Commission abused its discretion
when it refused to accept Petitioner's undisputed evidence in support of his increased rate
claim. As the ultimate finder of fact, the Commission cannot disregard undisputed
material facts. This Court should reverse the Commission, grant Petitioner's increased
compensation rate, and award him previously underpaid monies and interest.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES WITH STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1
Statement of the Issue
Whether the statute required the Administrative Law Judge to ask Petitioner if he
had evidence to present on his claim for increased compensation, and if not, whether
Petitioner's failure to interject unsolicited evidence at the hearing amounted to a waiver
of his claim.
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review, With Supporting Authority
This Court should review the Commission's conclusion that Petitioner waived his
claim and that the Administrative Law Judge improperly raised issues sua sponte because
they were questions of law, which this Court reviews for correctness. Savage Indus, v.
State Tax Comm 'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991). "When reviewing pure questions of
law, we accord no particular deference to the agency decision . . . but review such
conclusions for correctness." Hilton Hotel v. Indus. Comm 'n, 897 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah
App. 1995) (internal citations and quotations omitted). This Court should review for
correctness, and give no deference to the Commission's legal conclusions.

vii

Citation to the Record Preserving The Issue For Appeal
Petitioner preserved the issue on appeal in his Memorandum in Opposition to
Respondents' Motion for Review R 101- 103. Alternatively, the issue need not have been
preserved because it arose from the Commission's errant Orders that denied Petitioner's
claim.
Issue 2
Statement of the Issue
Whether the Commission abused its discretion as the ultimate finder of fact when
it refused to consider additional undisputed evidence supporting the Judge's award of
increased compensation rate in Petitioner's response to Respondent's Motion for Review.
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review, With Supporting Authority
This Court should review the Commission's refusal to consider additional
evidence for abuse of discretion. The statute gave the Commission explicit discretion to
accept additional evidence in deciding Respondent's motion for review. Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-l-403(c)(ii). Therefore, this Court should review for abuse of discretion under
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h); Drake v. Indus. Comm % 939 177, 181-82 (Utah
1997).

vni

Citation to the Record Preserving The Issue For Appeal
Petitioner preserved the issue on appeal in his Memorandum in Opposition to
Respondents' Motion for Review R 120 - 125, and his Request for Reconsideration, R
230-231.
PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-307 is set forth verbatim in the Appendix.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801 is set forth verbatim in the Appendix.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8 is set forth verbatim in the Appendix.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 is set forth verbatim in the Appendix.
Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1 is set forth verbatim in the Appendix.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a denial of workers compensation benefits by the Labor
Commission. Acting pro se, Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing alleging
entitlement to inter alia increased compensation rate and interest because his earnings at
the time of the accident justified the increase. R 1. Respondents filed an Answer that
joined the issue of increased compensation rate. R 12-15.
The ALJ held that Petitioner was entitled to an increased rate, and raised his
weekly compensation rate from $55.00 to $202.00, and ordered Respondents to pay past
due benefits with interest. R 24 - 28. Respondents filed a Motion for Review. R 29 - 86.
Petitioner filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Respondents' Motion for Review. R 95
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-198. Along with his Memorandum, Petitioner attached his sworn affidavit with exhibits
that showed higher wages at the time of his accident that entitled him to the increased
compensation rate. He also attached a copy of the hearing transcript. Id. Respondents
filed a Reply but did not challenge Petitioner's affidavit. R200 - 209.
The Commission issued its Order Granting Motion for Review, which reversed the
ALJ's Order, and held that Petitioner did not raise his claim for increased compensation
rate. R 222 - 227. Petitioner filed a Request for Reconsideration. R 228 - 251.
Respondents filed a Response to Request for Consideration. R 254 - 259. The
Commission issued its Order Denying Request for Resconsideration, and held that
Petitioner "affirmatively limited" his claims, and "waived" his claim for increased
compensation rate at the hearing, but did not cite to the hearing transcript. R 264 - 266.
This appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This Court should reverse the Commission and find that Petitioner's wages at the
time of the accident entitled him to a weekly compensation rate of $202.00, and order
Respondents to pay Petitioner previously underpaid benefits with interest. The ALJ
appropriately addressed Petitioner's entitlement to the increased compensation rate
because the issue was joined by the parties' pleadings. The record shows that ALJ did not
act sua sponte because Petitioner's application for hearing raised the issue as a matter of
law.
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This Court should also hold that Petitioner did not "affirmatively limit" or "waive"
his increased compensation claim. The transcript showed that Petitioner never limited or
waived that claim because the ALJ never asked him about it. This Court should hold as a
matter of law that Petitioner's failure to interject unsolicited evidence did not amount to a
waiver of his increased compensation claim. Further, if the ALJ erred because should
have asked Petitioner about the claims identified in his Application for Hearing, dismissal
of Petitioner's claims was a totally inappropriate remedy. This Court should reverse the
Commission, find that Petitioner's wages entitled him to weekly compensation rate of
$202.00, and order Respondents to pay previously underpaid benefits with interest.
Finally, this Court should hold that the Commission abused its discretion when it
refused to consider relevant undisputed evidence. The facts show that Petitioner provided
sworn testimony and exhibits that established his entitlement to a higher compensation
rate. Respondents failed to challenge any part of the evidence. As the ultimate finder of
fact, the Commission must consider relevant undisputed evidence, and has no discretion
to ignore such evidence. This Court should reverse the Commission, find that Petitioner's
wages entitled him to weekly compensation rate of $202.00, and order Respondents to
pay previously underpaid benefits with interest.
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FACTS
1.

On July 22, 1983, Petitioner/Appellant Richard D. Grint ("Petitioner") was

injured in the course and scope of his employment with his employer, Trimco Molding.
Petitioner's accident occurred when he fell out of the back of a truck and injured his right
arm. R24.
2.

Respondents/Appellees Trimco Molding and its insurer ("Respondents")

accepted liability for the industrial accident. After Petitioner's initial right arm surgery,
he has had numerous complications. Over the years, Respondents have carefully
monitored and paid for Petitioner's medical treatment expenses, amounting to at least
$237,160.04 in medical treatment expenses, covering approximately thirty surgeries. R
13.
3.

On June 5, 1984, Petitioner wrote to inform Trimco's insurer that his wages

were higher than its records reflected. R 122. Petitioner received no response to his
letter.
4.

On May 18, 1987, Petitioner was assigned an impairment rating of 24 %

upper extremity impairment (14% whole person impairment) by Dr. Mark Greene. R 21.
5.

On March 1, 2004, Petitioner filed an application for hearing pro se.

Among other things, Petitioner alleged that he made $14.00 per hour and was scheduled
to work 20 hours during the week of the accident. R 1.
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6.

Respondents answered Petitioner's application for hearing. Respondent

denied that Petitioner's assertions about his wages at the time of the accident: "Please
note that Petitioner's average weekly wage was only $60.00; thus, his workers'
compensation rate was $45.00 plus $10.00 for dependents for a total of $55.00 per week."
Respondents also claimed they paid Petitioner a total of $14,907.85 in weekly benefits at
the rate of $55.00 per week, for a total of approximately 271 weeks. Answer at 2, R 13.
7.

On February 16, 2005, Petitioner appeared at the scheduled hearing, acting

8.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted the hearing. During the

pro se.

course of the hearing, the ALJ did not ask Petitioner about his increased compensation
rate claim, or the higher wages identified in his application for hearing, and denied by
Respondents. See generally, Hearing Transcript, R 127-190.
9.

On March 23, 2005, the ALJ issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Order (the ALJ's Order). Among other things, the ALJ's Order increased
Petitioner's compensation rate to reflect the wages plead in his applications for hearing,
increasing the weekly rate from $55.00 to $202.00. R 24-28.
10.

Respondents filed a Motion for Review, and Petitioner retained legal

counsel.
11.

Petitioner filed a Memorandum In Opposition to Respondent's Motion for

Review. R 95. Petitioner attached a sworn affidavit with exhibits, including paystubs
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that showed his wages at the time of the industrial accident. R 120-125. Petitioner also
attached a transcript of the 2/16/05 hearing. R 127 -190.
12.

Respondents filed a Reply, but did not challenge any part of Petitioner's

affidavit, or supporting documents, or that the facts entitled Petitioner to a higher
compensation rate. R 260-63.
13.

The Labor Commission granted Respondent's Motion, reversing all but one

paragraph of the ALJ's Order. Order Granting Motion for Review at 4, R 225. The
Order stated:
The Commission has carefully reviewed the entire record in
this matter and notes that only two issues were submitted to
Judge Sessions for decision: Mr. Grint's right to medical
benefits and his right to additional permanent partial disability
compensation for an increased impairment rating. Judge
Sessions did not inform the parties that he intended to
adjudicate any other issues. Consequently, the evidence and
argument presented during the hearing focused entirely on the
two issues raised by Mr. Grint. But the decision issued by
Judge Sessions went beyond those two issues to increase the
rate of disability compensation, both retroactively and
prospectively, and to award additional temporary total
disability compensation. In light of the decisions of the Utah
Court of Appeals and Utah Supreme Court cited above, the
Commission concludes it was error for Judge Sessions to raise
and decide these additional issues.. . . The Commission will
therefore set aside Judge Sessions' decision on those issues.
Order Granting Motion for Review at 2 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted), R 223.
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14.

The footnote to this paragraph stated:
The record in this matter illustrates the necessity of
limiting decisions to those issues actually raised during the
hearing process. Because no one identified compensation rate
or duration of temporary total disability as disputed issues, no
evidence or argument was presented on those issues.
Consequently, when Judge Sessions addressed those issues
sua sponte, he relied on incomplete evidence and reached
conclusions that may be significantly inaccurate.

Order Granting Motion for Review at 2 (footnote text), R 223.
15.

The Order failed to identify any part of the hearing transcript that supported

its conclusion. Id.
16.

Petitioner filed a Request for Reconsideration on the issue of higher

wages/increased compensation rate. R 228-251.
17.

The Commission denied Petitioner's Request. It reasoned that:
The essential fact missing from Mr. Grint's argument
is that, at the beginning of the evidentiary hearing on his
claim, Mr. Grint affirmatively stated to Judge Sessions and
Trimco that the claim was limited to permanent partial
disability compensation for an increased impairment rating.
Consequently, neither party submitted evidence or argument
on any other issues, nor did Judge Sessions inquire into any
other issues.
In light of the limits Mr. Grint placed on his claim,
Trimco was not required to produce evidence on any other
issues. Judge Sessions erred, not by failing to pursue other
issues during the evidentiary hearing, but in later deciding
additional issues that Mr. Grint had excluded from
consideration. And because such additional issues were
waived by Mr. Grint, the Commission will not consider posthearing evidence on those issues.
xv

Order Denying Request for Reconsideration at 1-2, R 264-5.
18.

The Order failed to identify any part of the hearing transcript where

Petitioner "affirmatively stated" that his claim was "limited" to permanent partial
disability benefits, or where he "excluded" or "waived" his claim to a higher
compensation rate. Id.
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ARGUMENT
L

This Court Should Hold That Petitioner Raised The Issue Of Increased
Compensation Rate When He Plead Higher Wages In His Application for
Hearing, And That He Did Not Waive The Issue At The Hearing.
A^

Petitioner Raised His Claim For Increased Compensation Rate In His
Application For Hearing.

Petitioner raised his claim for increased compensation rate when he alleged higher
wages in his application for hearing. Issues are "raised" when the parties have identified
facts in their pleadings that entitle them to relief. Utah R Civ P 8(a). "Pleadings" include
a complaint and answer, Utah R Civ. P 7(a): In workers' compensation cases, the
pleadings include applications for hearing and answers. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801;
UAR 602-2-1(B)(1), (C)(l)-(2), and (N). Put another way, parties raise issues when they
plead facts in an application for hearing that entitle them to relief. In this case, Petitioner
plead higher wages in his application for hearing. Facts ^f 5. Moreover, Respondents
specifically joined issue on Petitioner's increased compensation rate in their Answer.
Facts f 6. This Court should find that Petitioner raised his claim for increased
compensation rate because he alleged higher wages in his application for hearing.
The ALJ did not address Petitioner's increased compensation rate sua sponte. The
Commission errantly concluded that the ALJ had addressed Petitioner's claim for
increased compensation rate sua sponte. Facts \ 14. The Commission relied on the case

of Hilton Hotel v. Indus. Comm % 897 P.2d 352 (Utah App. 1995), but that case supports
Petitioner's position.
In Hilton Hotel, the Petitioner filed an application for hearing, and alleged an
industrial injury on April 19, 1992, when she lifted a heavy tub of dishes. Id. at 353.
After the hearing, the ALJ determined that the Petitioner had been injured by accident
under a cumulative trauma theory - relying not only on the single incident, but on the
cumulative effect of multiple exertions. But Petitioner did not plead that theory in her
application for hearing, nor had she raised the theory during the hearing. Id. at 355. This
Court reasoned that "Because cumulative trauma was not an expressed or implied theory
presented by Jacobsen, she waived the right to advance that claim. Therefore, the
Commission's decision regarding this issue was outside the issues presented for
adjudication and is a nullity." Id. at 356. This Court concluded that "Hilton was never
apprised by Jacobsen that a basis of her claim was cumulative trauma. As a result, Hilton
was denied the opportunity to present evidence and challenge this type of claim." Id. But
where the Petitioner raises the issue in the pleadings, Hilton Hotel does not apply.
The Hilton Hotel case does not apply to this case because the issue was raised and
joined in the pleadings. Unlike Hilton Hotel, Petitioner raised the issue in his Application
for Hearing, Facts ^j 5, and Respondents' joined the issue in its Answer. Facts ^f 6. The
ALJ increased Petitioner's compensation rate. Facts \ 9. The record shows that the
parties and the ALJ were aware of the issue; neither of the Commission's Orders
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acknowledged that the parties joined this issue. Where the issue was raised and joined by
the parties pleadings, the ALJ simply addressed the disputed claim and did not act sua
sponte. Cf9 Order at 2 n. 2. The Commission's errant

(<

sua sponte " conclusion can not

be reconciled with the record. The Hilton Hotel case supports Petitioner's position, and
undermines the Commission's Order.
This Court should hold that Petitioner raised the issue of increased compensation
rate as a matter of law when he plead higher wages in his application for hearing. The
Commission's legal conclusion that Petitioner did not raise the issue is not entitled to
deference and is reviewed for correctness. Savage Indus, v. State Tax Comm yn, 811 P.2d
664, 670 (Utah 1991); Hilton Hotel, 897 P.2d at 354. This Court should reverse the
Commission and reinstate the ALJ's finding that Petitioner was entitled to an increased
compensation rate, and order previously underpaid compensation to be paid at the
increased compensation rate, with interest.
Having shown that Petitioner raised the issue of increased compensation rate, the
facts also show that he did not waive that issue at the hearing.
B.

Petitioner Did Not Waive His Claim At The Hearing.

This Court should find that Petitioner did not waive his claim for increased
compensation rate at the hearing. The Commission's Orders failed to cite to any part of
the hearing transcript to support its conclusions. The first Order baldly asserted that
Petitioner only raised two issues: additional permanent partial impairment and medical
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treatment expenses. Facts TJ 13. The second Order said that Petitioner "affirmatively
limited" his claims, and "waived" his claim to increased compensation rate. Facts ^ 17.
But the Order failed to cite to the transcript where Petitioner allegedly limited or waived
his claims.1 Facts ^ 18. That is because Petitioner did not "affirmatively limit" his claims
or "waive" others. Instead, the transcript showed that the ALJ never asked Petitioner
about his increased compensation rate, even though he raised the issue in his pleadings.
The facts simply do not support the Commission's conclusion that Petitioner
"affirmatively limited" his claims, or "waived" his claim to increased compensation.2
Petitioner did not waive his increased compensation claim because the ALJ never
questioned him about it. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(l)(a), the ALJ "shall
regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford
all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions." See also, Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-1-307. Petitioner did not conduct the hearing, and as a pro se litigant, should
not be expected to do more than answer questions and present evidence when prompted
1

Petitioner had already supplied the Commission with a copy of the hearing
transcript at his expense when he filed his Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Review. If the transcript had supported the Commission's conclusions, the Commission
would have cited to the applicable portion(s).
2

Nor should Petitioner have to make out the Commission's case to attack it
on appeal. Where Petitioner supplied the Commission with a hearing transcript at his
own expense, and the Commission did not even cite to where Petitioner allegedly
"limited" or "waived" his claims, the Order is deficient as a matter of law. Adams v. Bd.
Of Review of Indus. Comm % 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1991). The Order's failure to
adequately explain its conclusions with supporting facts provides an independent basis for
reversal.
4

by the Judge. The ALJ should have asked the parties to present evidence on the issue of
increased compensation rate, but did not. Apparently, when Respondents showed up with
no witnesses, the ALJ deduced that they could not dispute Petitioner's wage allegations.
Accordingly, the Judge relied on the pleadings to find that Petitioner was entitled to a
higher compensation rate.3 These facts do not support the Commission's conclusion that
Petitioner waived his claim to a higher compensation rate. This Court should find that
Petitioner raised the issue in his pleadings, and did not waive the claim at the hearing.
Alternatively, Petitioner should be punished for judicial error. The Commission's
first Order found Judge Sessions blameworthy when it charged that he "relied on
incomplete evidence," and "reached conclusions that may be significantly inaccurate"
when he addressed Petitioner's increased wage claim "sua sponte" Facts ^f 14. Even if it
were possible to address a claim sua sponte that was first raised in the pleadings, the
appropriate remedy was not to dismiss Petitioner's claims. The Commission should have
remanded the case with instructions if it believed the judge erred. But the Commission
did not remand: It denounced the Judge and dismissed Petitioner's claims.
The Commission's Order wrongly tried to lower the bar for ALJs, and set a trap
for unwary Petitioners. Under the Commission's Order, ALJs need not question parties
about issues raised in the pleadings. When that happens, Petitioners who fail to interject

3

Even if it was error for the ALJ to rely on the pleadings, it was rendered
harmless by Petitioner's subsequent undisputed affidavit and exhibits. Facts ffij 11 and
12.
5

their claims will be found to have "waived" those claims. But the statute commands
otherwise. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(l)(a), the ALJ "shall. . . obtain full
disclosure of relevant facts" at hearings. Accordingly, Petitioners have no duty to
interject unsolicited evidence of their claims upon pain of waiver. This Court should
reverse the Commission, and reinstate the ALJ's finding that Petitioner was entitled to an
increased compensation rate, and order previously under paid compensation to be paid at
the increased rate, with interest.
II,

This Court Should Hold That The Commission Abused Its Discretion When It
Refused To Accept Petitioner's Sworn Affidavit And Paystubs Into Evidence.
The Commission abused its discretion when it rejected Petitioner's affidavit and

paystubs that showed his higher earnings at the time of the accident. The Commission is
the ultimate finder of fact. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12(6)(iii); Accord, Hoskings, v.
Indus. Comm% 918 P.2d 150 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied, 918 P.2d 150; Comm
Carriers v. Indus. Comm'n, 888 P.2d 707 (Utah App. 1994); Chase v Indus Comm'n,
872 475 (Utah App. 1994). Accordingly, it may accept new evidence in a motion for
review (or response thereto) before it issues a final order. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b12(4); Accord, United States Steel Corp.v. Indus. Comm % 607 P.2d 807, 811 (Utah
1980).
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The Commission refused to accept Petitioner's undisputed testimony and
documents into evidence, even though it was the ultimate finder of fact. Petitioner filed a
sworn affidavit with exhibits, including paystubs that showed his higher wages at the time
of the accident, along with his Memorandum in Opposition to Respondents' Motion for
Review.4 Facts ^ 11. Respondent failed to controvert these facts in its Reply. Facts ^f 12.
The Commission should have considered Petitioner's affidavit because it was central to
the issue on appeal, and because Respondents failed to challenge the evidence when it
had the opportunity. Instead, it held that "because such additional issues were waived by
[Petitioner], the Commission will not consider post-hearing evidence on those issues."
Facts Tj 17. The Commission erred when it concluded that Petitioner "waived" his claim,
and its refusal to accept undisputed relevant evidence was predicated on legal error.
Putting aside the Commission's legal error, it should have considered Petitioner's
evidence in its role as the ultimate finder of fact.
The Commission abused its discretion when it refused to consider Petitioner's
uncontroverted sworn testimony and exhibits. In the case of Martinez v. MediaPaymaster Plus, 2005 Utah App. 308, 117 P.3d 1074, this Court held that the
Commission abused its discretion when it ignored the only evidence on point. In that
case, the employer's own expert witness admitted there were no jobs Mr. Martinez could

4

Had the ALJ questioned Petitioner in the hearing about his higher
compensation rate, Petitioner would have offered his testimony and the exhibits into
evidence. Facts \ 11, R 120-125.
7

perform, but the Commission held that work was "reasonably available" to him. Id. at ^J
16, 1078-79. In other words, where the only evidence showed that there were no jobs Mr.
Martinez could perform, the Commission abused its discretion when it ignored that
evidence. As the ultimate finder of fact, the Commission abused its discretion when it
disregarded undisputed relevant evidence.
Similarly, the Commission abused its discretion when it refused to consider
Petitioner's undisputed relevant evidence. Petitioner produced a sworn affidavit and
exhibits, including paystubs that showed Petitioner's entitlement to an increased
compensation rate. Respondents filed a Reply, but failed to challenge any part of the
affidavit, or to deny that the evidence would entitle Petitioner to an increased
compensation rate. This Court should find that the Commission's exclusion of relevant
admissible evidence was an abuse of discretion, given its role as the ultimate finder of
fact.
This Court should hold that the Commission abused its discretion when it refused
to consider Petitioner's undisputed sworn testimony and supporting documents that
showed his entitlement to a higher compensation rate. This Court should reverse the
Commission, find that Petitioner was entitled to an increased compensation rate of
$202.00 per week, and order the Respondents to repay previously underpaid amounts,
with interest.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the Commission and find that Petitioner's wages at the
time of the accident entitled him to a weekly compensation rate of $202.00, and order
Respondents to pay Petitioner previously underpaid benefits with interest. The ALJ
appropriately addressed Petitioner's entitlement to the increased compensation rate
because the issue was joined by the parties' pleadings. The record shows that ALJ did not
act sua sponte because Petitioner's application for hearing raised the issue as a matter of
law.
This Court should also hold that Petitioner did not "affirmatively limit" or "waive"
his increased compensation claim. The transcript showed that Petitioner never limited or
waived that claim because the ALJ never asked him about it. This Court should hold as a
matter of law that Petitioner's failure to interject unsolicited evidence did not amount to a
waiver of his increased compensation claim. Further, if the ALJ erred because should
have asked Petitioner about the claims identified in his Application for Hearing, dismissal
of Petitioner's claims was a totally inappropriate remedy. This Court should reverse the
Commission, find that Petitioner's wages entitled him to weekly compensation rate of
$202.00, and order Respondents to pay previously underpaid benefits with interest.
Finally, this Court should hold that the Commission abused its discretion when it
refused to consider relevant undisputed evidence. The facts show that Petitioner provided
sworn testimony and exhibits that established his entitlement to a higher compensation
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rate. Respondents failed to challenge any part of the evidence. As the ultimate finder of
fact, the Commission must consider relevant undisputed evidence, and has no discretion
to ignore such evidence. This Court should reverse the Commission, find that Petitioner's
wages entitled him to weekly compensation rate of $202.00, and order Respondents to
pay previously underpaid benefits with interest.
DATED this 18th day of October, 2006.
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP, P.C.

Richard R. Burke
Attorneys for Petitioner
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Utah Code Section 34A-1-307

Page 1 of 1

34A-1-307. Action permitted in adjudicative proceedings.
For the purposes mentioned in this title, the commission may take any action permitted:
(1) if a formal adjudicative proceeding, under Section 63-46b-7 or 63-46b-8; or
(2) if an informal adjudicative proceeding, under Section 63-46b-5.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 375, 1997 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 34A01019.ZIP 1,755 Bytes
Sections in this Chapter|Chapters in this Title|AH Titles]Legislative Home Page
Liist revised. Tuesday, October 03, 2006
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Utah Code Section 34A-2-801
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34A-2-801. Initiating adjudicative proceedings — Procedure for review of administrative
action.
(1) (a) To contest an action of the employee's employer or its insurance carrier concerning a
compensable industrial accident or occupational disease alleged by the employee, any of the following
shall file an application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication:
(i) the employee; or
(ii) a representative of the employee, the qualifications of whom are defined in rule by the
commission.
(b) To appeal the imposition of a penalty or other administrative act imposed by the division on the
employer or its insurance carrier for failure to comply with this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act, any of the following shall file an application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication:
(i) the employer;
(ii) the insurance carrier; or
(iii) a representative of either the employer or the insurance carrier, the qualifications of whom are
defined in rule by the commission.
(c) A person providing goods or services described in Subsections 34A-2-407(12) and 34A-3-108
(12) may file an application for hearing in accordance with Section 34A-2-407 or 34A-3-108.
(d) An attorney may file an application for hearing in accordance with Section 34A-1-309.
(2) Unless a party in interest appeals the decision of an administrative law judge in accordance with
Subsection (3), the decision of an administrative law judge on an application for hearing filed under
Subsection (1) is a final order of the commission 30 days after the date the decision is issued.
(3) (a) A party in interest may appeal the decision of an administrative law judge by filing a motion
for review with the Division of Adjudication within 30 days of the date the decision is issued.
(b) Unless a party in interest to the appeal requests under Subsection (3)(c) that the appeal be heard
by the Appeals Board, the commissioner shall hear the review.
(c) A party in interest may request that an appeal be heard by the Appeals Board by filing the request
with the Division of Adjudication:
(i) as part of the motion for review; or
(ii) if requested by a party in interest who did not file a motion for review, within 20 days of the date
the motion for review is filed with the Division of Adjudication.
(d) A case appealed to the Appeals Board shall be decided by the majority vote of the Appeals Board.
(4) All records on appeals shall be maintained by the Division of Adjudication. Those records shall
include an appeal docket showing the receipt and disposition of the appeals on review.
(5) Upon appeal, the commissioner or Appeals Board shall make its decision in accordance with
Section 34A-1-303.
(6) The commissioner or Appeals Board shall promptly notify the parties to any proceedings before it
of its decision, including its findings and conclusions.
(7) The decision of the commissioner or Appeals Board is final unless within 30 days
after the date the decision is issued further appeal is initiated under the provisions of this section or Title
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
(8) (a) Within 30 days after the date the decision of the commissioner or Appeals Board is issued,
any aggrieved party may secure judicial review by commencing an action in the court of appeals against
tne commissioner or Appeals Board for the review of the decision of the commissioner or Appeals
Board.
(b) In an action filed under Subsection (8)(a):
(i) any other party to the proceeding before the commissioner or Appeals Board shall be made a
party; and
(ii) the commission shall be made a party.
(c) A party claiming to be aggrieved may seek judicial review only if the party has exhausted the
]3arty's remedies before the commission as provided by this section.
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(d) At the request of the court of appeals, the commission shall certify and file with the court all
documents and papers and a transcript of all testimony taken in the matter together with the decision of
the commissioner or Appeals Board.
Amended by Chapter 295, 2006 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 34A02069.ZIP 3,724 Bytes
Sections in this Chapter]Chapters in this Title|All TitlesjLegislative Home Page
Last revised Tuesday, October 03, 2006
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Utah Code Section 63-46b-8
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63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Hearing procedure.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3 (d)(i) and (ii), in all formal adjudicative proceedings,
a hearing shall be conducted as follows:
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant
facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions.
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding officer:
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious;
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah;
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy or excerpt
contains all pertinent portions of the original document;
(iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially noticed under the Utah Rules of
Evidence, of the record of other proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific facts within
the agency's specialized knowledge.
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay.
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to present evidence, argue,
respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit rebuttal evidence.
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity
to present oral or written statements at the hearing.
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be considered in reaching a
decision on the merits, shall be given under oath.
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense.
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the agency prepare a transcript of
the hearing, subject to any restrictions that the agency is permitted by statute to impose to protect
confidential information disclosed at the hearing.
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties.
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate measures necessary
to preserve the integrity of the hearing.
Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 63JE011.ZIP 2,821 Bytes
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63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure.
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review
of an order by the agency or by a superior agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request for
review within 30 days after the issuance of the order with the person or entity designated for that
purpose by the statute or rule.
(b) The request shall:
(i) be signed by the party seeking review;
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested;
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and
(iv) be mailed to the presiding officer and to each party.
(2) (a) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within the time period
provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may file a response with the person designated
by statute or rule to receive the response.
(b) The party who files a response under Subsection (2)(a) shall mail a copy of the response to each
of the parties and to the presiding officer.
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an order by the agency or a superior agency, the
agency or superior agency shall review the order within a reasonable time or within the time required by
statute or the agency's rules.
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule permit the parties to file
briefs or other documents, or to conduct oral argument.
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties.
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other filings, or oral argument, or
v/ithin the time required by statute or applicable rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a
written order on review.
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a person designated by the agency
for that purpose and shall be mailed to each party.
(c) The order on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed, or modified,
and whether all or any portion of the adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded;
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or judicial review available to
aggrieved parties; and
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review.
Amended by Chapter 138, 2001 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 63_1E015.ZIP 2,839 Bytes
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R602-2 1 Pleadings and Discovery
A Definitions
1 "Commission" means the Labor Commission
2 "Division" means the Division of Adjudication within the Labor Commission
3 "Application for Hearing" means the request for agency action iegardmg a workers' compensation claim
4 "Supporting medical documentation" means a Summary of Medical Record or other medical report oi
tieatment note completed by a physician that indicates the presence or absence of a medical causal connection
between benefits sought and the alleged industrial injury
5 "Authorization to Release Medical Records" is a form authorizing the injured workers' medical providers to
provide medical iecords and other medical information to the commission or a party
6 "Supporting documents" means supporting medical documentation, list of medical pio\ iders \uthoiization to
Release Medical Records and, when applicable, an Appointment of Counsel Foim
7 "Petitioner" means the peison oi entity who has filed an Application foi Ileanng
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8. "Respondent" means the person or entity against whom the Application for Hearing was filed.
9. "Discovery motion" includes a motion to compel or a motion for protective order.
B. Application for Hearing.
1. Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is denied by an employer or insurance carrier, the burden rests
with the injured worker, or medical provider, to initiate agency action by filing an Application for Hearing with the
Division. Applications for hearing shall include an original, notarized Authorization to Release Medical Records.
2. An employer, insurance carrier, or any other party with standing under the Workers' Compensation Act may
obtain a hearing before the Adjudication Division by filing a request for agency action with the Division.
3. All Applications for Hearing shall include any available supporting medical documentation of the claim where
there is a dispute over medical issues. Applications for Hearing without supporting documentation and a properly
completed Authorization to Release Medical Records may not be mailed to the employer or insurance carrier for
answer until the appropriate documents have been provided. In addition to respondent's answer, a respondent may
file a motion to dismiss the Application for Hearing where there is no supporting medical documentation filed to
demonstrate medical causation when such is at issue between the parties.
4. When an Application for Hearing with appropriate supporting documentation is filed with the Division, the
Division shall forthwith mail to the respondents a copy of the Application for Hearing, supporting documents and
Notice of Formal Adjudication and Order for Answer.
5. In cases where the injured worker is represented by an attorney, a completed and signed Appointment of
Counsel form shall be filed with the Application for Hearing or upon retention of the attorney.
C. Answer.
1. The respondent(s) shall have 30 days from the date of mailing of the Order for Answer, to file a written answer
to the Application for Hearing.
2. The answer shall admit or deny liability for the claim and shall state the reasons liability is denied. The answer
shall state all affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail that the petitioner and the Division may be fully
informed of the nature and substance of the defenses asserted.
3. All answers shall include a summary of benefits which have been paid to date on the claim, designating such
payments by category, i.e. medical expenses, temporary total disability, permanent partial disability, etc.
4. When liability is denied based upon medical issues, copies of all available medical reports sufficient to support
the denial of liability shall be filed with the answer.
5. If the answer filed by the respondents fails to sufficiently explain the basis of the denial, fails to include
available medical reports or records to support the denial, or contains affirmative defenses without sufficient factual
detail to support the affirmative defense, the Division may strike the answer filed and order the respondent to file
within 20 days, a new answer which conforms with the requirements of this rule.
6. All answers must state whether the respondent is willing to mediate the claim.
7. Petitioners are allowed to timely amend the Application for Hearing, and respondents are allowed to timely
amend the answer, as newly discovered information becomes available that would warrant the amendment. The
parties shall not amend their pleadings later than 45 days prior to the scheduled hearing without leave of the
Administrative Law Judge.
8. Responses and answers to amended pleadings shall be filed within ten days of service of the amended pleading
without further order of the Labor Commission.
D. Default
1. If a respondent fails to file an answer as provided in Subsection C above, the Division may enter a default
against the respondent.
2. If default is entered against a respondent, the Division may conduct any further proceedings necessary to take
evidence and determine the issues raised by the Application for Hearing without the participation of the party in
default pursuant to Section 63-46b-11(4), Utah Code.
3. A default of a respondent shall not be construed to deprive the Employer's Reinsurance Fund or Uninsured
Employers' Fund of any appropriate defenses.

http://www.rules.utah.gov/publicat/code/r602/r602-002.htm

10/18/2006

UT Admin Code R602-2. Adjudication of Workers' Compensation and Occupational Dise... Page 3 of 9

4. The defaulted party may file a motion to set aside the default under the procedures set forth in Section 63-46011(3), Utah Code. The Adjudication Division shall set aside defaults upon written and signed stipulation of all parties
to the action.
E. Waiver of Hearing.
1. The parties may, with the approval of the administrative law judge, waive their right to a hearing and enter into
a stipulated set of facts, which may be submitted to the administrative law judge. The administrative law judge may
use the stipulated facts, medical records and evidence in the record to make a final determination of liability or refer
the matter to a Medical Panel for consideration of the medical issues pursuant to R602-2-2.
2. Stipulated facts shall include sufficient facts to address all the issues raised in the Application for Hearing and
answer.
3. In cases where Medical Panel review is required, the administrative law judge may forward the evidence in the
record, including but not limited to, medical records, fact stipulations, radiographs and deposition transcripts, to a
medical panel for assistance in resolving the medical issues.
F. Discovery.
1. Upon filing the answer, the respondent and the petitioner may commence discovery. Discovery allowed under
this rule may include interrogatories, requests for production of documents, depositions, and medical examinations.
Discovery shall not include requests for admissions. Appropriate discovery under this rule shall focus on matters
relevant to the claims and defenses at issue in the case. All discovery requests are deemed continuing and shall be
promptly supplemented by the responding party as information comes available.
2. Without leave of the administrative law judge, or written stipulation, any party may serve upon any other party
written interrogatories, not exceeding 25 in number, including all discrete subparts, to be answered by the party
served. The frequency or extent of use of interrogatories, requests for production of documents, medical examinations
and/or depositions shall be limited by the administrative law judge if it is determined that:
a. The discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from another source that is
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
b. The party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the discovery
sought; or
c. The discoveiy is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the adjudication.
3. Upon reasonable notice, the respondent may require the petitioner to submit to a medical examination by a
physician of the respondent's choice.
4. All parties may conduct depositions pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 34A-1-308,
Utah Code.
5. Requests for production of documents are allowed, but limited to matters relevant to the claims and defenses at
issue in the case, and shall not include requests for documents provided with the petitioner's Application for Hearing,
nor the respondents' answer.
6. Parties shall diligently pursue discovery so as not to delay the adjudication of the claim. If a hearing has been
scheduled, discovery motions shall be filed no later than 45 days prior to the hearing unless leave of the administrative
law judge is obtained.
7. Discovery motions shall contain copies of all relevant documents pertaining to the discoveiy- at issue, such as
mailing certificates and follow up requests for discovery. The responding party shall have 10 days from the date the
discovery motion is mailed to file a response to the discovery motion.
8. Parties conducting discovery under this rule shall maintain mailing certificates and follow up letters regarding
discovery to submit in the event Division intervention is necessary to complete discovery. Discovery documents shall
not be filed with the Division at the time they are forwarded to opposing parties.
9. Any party who fails to obey an administrative law judge's discovery order shall be subject to the sanctions
available under Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
G. Subpoenas.
1. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all discovery proceedings to compel the attendance of witnesses.
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All subpoenas shall be signed by the administrative law judge assigned to the case, or the duty judge where the
assigned judge is not available. Subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses shall be served at least 14 days prior
to the hearing consistent with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 45. Witness fees and mileage shall be paid by the party
which subpoenas the witness.
2. A subpoena to produce records shall be served on the holder of the record at least 14 days prior to the date
specified in the subpoena as provided in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 45. All fees associated with the production of
documents shall be paid by the party which subpoenas the record.
II. Medical Records Exhibit.
1. The parties are expected to exchange medical records during the discovery period.
2. Petitioner shall submit all relevant medical records contained in his/her possession to the respondent for the
preparation of a joint medical records exhibit at least twenty (20) working days prior to the scheduled hearing.
3. The respondent shall prepare a joint medical record exhibit containing all relevant medical records. The
medical record exhibit shall include all relevant treatment records that tend to prove or disprove a fact in issue.
Hospital nurses' notes, duplicate materials, and other non-relevant materials need not be included in the medical
record exhibit.
4. The medical records shall be indexed, paginated, arranged by medical care provider in chronological order and
bound.
5. The medical record exhibit prepared by the respondent shall be delivered to the Division and the petitioner or
petitioner's counsel at least ten (10) working days prior to the hearing. Late-filed medical records may or may not be
admitted at the discretion of the administrative law judge by stipulation or for good cause shown.
6. The administrative law judge may require the respondent to submit an additional copy of the joint medical
record exhibit in cases referred to a medical panel.
7. The petitioner is responsible to obtain radiographs and diagnostic films for review by the medical panel. The
administrative law judge shall issue subpoenas where necessary to obtain radiology films.
I. Hearing.
1. Notices of hearing shall be mailed to the addresses of record of the parties. The parties shall provide current
addresses to the Division for receipt of notices or risk the entry of default and loss of the opportunity to participate at
the hearing.
2. Judgment may be entered without a hearing after default is entered or upon stipulation and waiver of a hearing
by the parties.
3. No later than 45 days prior to the scheduled hearing, all parties shall file a signed pretrial disclosure form that
identifies: (1) fact witnesses the parties actually intend to call at the hearing; (2) expert witnesses the parties actually
intend to call at the hearing; (3) language translator the parties intend to use at the hearing; (4) exhibits, including
reports, the parties intend to offer in evidence at the hearing; (5) the specific benefits or relief claimed by the
petitioner; (6) the specific defenses that the respondent actually intends to litigate; (7) whether, or not, a partyanticipates that the case will take more than four hours of hearing time; (8) the job categories or titles the respondents
claim the petitioner is capable of performing if the claim is for permanent total disability, and; (9) any other issues
that the parties intend to ask the administrative law judge to adjudicate. The administrative law judge may exclude
witnesses, exhibits, evidence, claims, or defenses as appropriate of any party who fails to timely file a signed pre-trial
disclosure form as set forth above. The parties shall supplement the pre-trial disclosure form with information that
newly becomes available after filing the original form. The pre-trial disclosure form does not replace other discovery
allowed under these rules.
4. If the petitioner requires the sendees of language translation during the hearing, the petitioner has the
obligation of providing a person who can translate between the petitioner's native language and English during the
hearing. If the respondents are dissatisfied with the proposed translator identified by the petitioner, the respondents
may provide a qualified translator for the hearing at the respondent's expense.
5. The petitioner shall appear at the hearing prepared to outline the benefits sought, such as the periods for which
compensation and medical benefits are sought, the amounts of unpaid medical bills, and a permanent partial
disability rating, if applicable. If mileage reimbursement for travel to receive medical care is sought, the petitioner
shall bring documentation of mileage, including the dates, the medical provider seen and the total mileage.
6. The respondent shall appear at the hearing prepared to address the merits of the petitioner's claim and provide
evidence to support any defenses timely raised.
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7. Parties are expected to be prepared to present their evidence on the date the hearing is scheduled. Requests for
continuances maybe granted or denied at the discretion of the administrative law judge for good cause shown. Lack of
diligence in preparing for the hearing shall not constitute good cause for a continuance.
8. Subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the Labor Commission, the evidentiary record shall be deemed closed
at the conclusion of the hearing, and no additional evidence will be accepted without leave of the administrative law
judge.
J. Motions-Time to Respond.
Responses to all motions other than discovery motions shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date the
motion was filed with the Division. Reply memoranda shall be filed within seven (7) days from the date a response was
filed with the Division.
K. Notices.
1. Orders and notices mailed by the Division to the last address of record provided by a party are deemed served
on that party.
2. Where an attorney appears on behalf of a party, notice of an action by the Division served on the attorney is
considered notice to the party represented by the attorney.
L. Form of Decisions.
Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudicative proceeding shall be issued in accordance with the provisions
of Section 63-46^5 or 63~46b-io, Utah Code.
M. Motions for Review.
1. Any party to an adjudicative proceeding may obtain review of an Order issued by an Administrative Law Judge
by filing a written request for review with the Adjudication Division in accordance with the provisions of Section 6346b-i2 and Section 34A-1-303, Utah Code. Unless a request for review is properly filed, the Administrative LawJudge's Order is the final order of the Commission. If a request for review is filed, other parties to the adjudicative
proceeding may file a response within 20 calendar days of the date the request for review was filed. If such a response
is filed, the party filing the original request for review may reply within 10 calendar days of the date the response was
filed. Thereafter the Administrative Law Judge shall:
a. Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order after holding such further hearing and receiving such further
evidence as may be deemed necessary;
b. Amend or modify the prior Order by a Supplemental Order; or
c. Refer the entire case for review under Section 34A-2-801, Utah Code.
2. If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental Order, as provided in this subsection, it shall be final
unless a request for review of the same is filed.
N. Procedural Rules.
In formal adjudicative proceedings, the Division shall generally follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
regarding discovery and the issuance of subpoenas, except as the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are modified by the
express provisions of Section 34A-2-802, Utah Code or as may be otherwise modified by these rules.
O. Requests for Reconsideration and Petitions for Judicial Review.
A request for reconsideration of an Order on Motion for Review may be allowed and shall be governed by the
provisions of Section 63-46^13, Utah Code. Any petition for judicial review of final agency action shall be governed by
the provisions of Section 63-46^14, Utah Code.
R602-2-2 Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel
Pursuant to Section 34A-2-601, the Commission adopts the following guidelines in determining the necessity of
submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where one or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant medical
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I sustained an injury by accident or occupational disease ansing out of and in the course of employment with the above named
s) on date(s)
c^
Employees)
JJjj//M
19 tfo / 20
of injury/exposure of occupational disease at the following
location
2 The accident/exposure
int/exposure <
occurred as fcWlov
lows fcl\ tiff 4£^C<L
tf£Q<C
e\h<?*J
3

The injuries/illnesses I sustained are

3x»*3^/Vf

£t&U4

¥

£iy#~J

The injury/illness caused tune off work from_
to
-> and,
K!(A&II>M Am OP Ms
filo*\ 7 if£ 4hnu
CuAeen^
I claim: (Please mark an "X" next to any issue you want an immediate hearing on and attach supporting documentation
for each issue marked - see reverse side.)
A K
Medical Expenses
D ^
Temporary Partial Compensation G
Travel Expenses
B
Recommended Medical Care
E J>£_ Permanent Partial Compensation H j / _ Interest
C ft Temporary Total Compensation
F
Permanent Total Compensation
I
Other (Specify)
_,andl
fj
per hC
My date of birth is
tf-^Jffif
. A t the time of injury/illness my wage was $__
was working & hours per week Also/I wajjfwas not married and had A
dependent children under age of 18 when I was
injured
^0
—
(You must include form 046, Authorization to Release Medical Records with list of all medical providers, with this application. If you
need additional space to provide the iaiormation requc^d on zither side cf tfete form or form *»46, you may attach additional pages.)

Date

AmrtEJant (Employee) (Please pnnt)

/0- 1'Aool
Printed Name of Attorney

State Bar #

Signature of Applicant

S"ST8D CApfc
Signature of Attorney

Street Address of Applicant

Street Address for Attorney

City/State/Zip Code of Applicant

(
City/State/Zip Code

dQ^eL

)
Telephone #

Applicant's Telephone #

Social Security #

UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS, AND FORMS NOT INCLUDING EMPLOYEE'S SUPg&RTING
DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION REFERENCED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS
FORM WILL BE FILED, BUT RETURNED FOR COMPLETION IN FULL.
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MICHAEL E. DYER [A3786]
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC
Attorneys for Trimco Moulding and/or
Argonaut Insurance Company
257 East 200 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2048
Telephone: (801) 521-7900
- BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH Case No. 20040182

RICHARD D. GRINT,
Petitioner,
ANSWER TO
APPLICATION FOR HEARING

v.
TRIMCO MOULDING and/or
ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY
Respondents.
—

h

—

•

—

—

Respondents, Trimco Moulding and/or Argonaut Insurance Company, by and through
counsel, answer the Application for Hearing as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
1.

Answering paragraphs 1,2, and 3, respondents admit the same.

2.

Answering paragraph 4, while respondents admit that petitioner was off of work

for various times, respondents allege that petitioner was appropriately paid temporary total
disability benefits, over those various times, for eight years following the industrial injury.
Respondents deny liability for further indemnity benefits as outlined by Utah law.
1

OCO12

3.

Answering paragraph 5, respondents are unaware of any medical expenses

which have not been paid. To date respondents have paid medical expenses of $237,160.04.
Respondents have paid indemnity benefits to petitioner in the amount of $14,907.85. This ,
figure includes the payment of a 24% upper extremity impairment in the amount of $2,488.00.
Please note that petitioner's average weekly wage was only $60.00; thus, his workers
compensation rate was $45.00 plus $10.00 for dependents for a total of $55.00 per week.
4.

Answering paragraph 6, respondents deny petitioner's average weekly wage

claim. Respondents further allege that petitioner only had two dependents at the time of
industrial injury on July 22, 1983.
5.

Respondents deny each and every allegation in the Application for Hearing not

previously admitted or qualified.
SECOND DEFENSE
Respondents allege that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65, petitioner in no case is
entitled to temporary total disability benefits after a period of eight years from the date of the
injury.
THIRD DEFENSE
Respondents allege that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65.1, temporary partial
disability benefits are not payable after eight years following the date of the injury.
Respondents further allege that, under this statute, petitioner must file an Application for
Hearing within such eight year period. Respondents deny that petitioner filed his Application
for Hearing in a timely fashion.

2

OOOl-l

FOURTH DEFENSE
Respondents allege that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-66, petitioner is not
entitled to permanent partial disability benefits after the expiration of an eight year period
following the industrial injury. Respondents allege that it is now well beyond that eight year
period.
FIFTH DEFENSE
Respondents allege that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99, petitioner's claim for
compensation must, in any event, be filed within eight years after the date of the industrial
accident. Respondents deny that petitioner has timely filed an Application for Hearing.
SIXTH DEFENSE
Respondents shall take petitioner's deposition, looking to see whether petitioner had
any pre-existing conditions. Under the law that existed in 1983, there may be potential
reimbursement from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund if the pre-existing condition warrants
such reimbursement. In the event that evidence warrants this claim, respondents shall file an
Amended Answer in order to join the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. At this point, a copy of
this Answer has been sent to the Employers' Reinsurance Fund as a courtesy, pending the
outcome of respondents further investigation.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
Respondents are willing to mediate the present claim.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
Respondents are unaware of any medical expense which has been denied to petitioner,
putting petitioner to his proof in this regard.
3
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WHEREFORE, having answered the AppMcation for Hearing, respondents pray that
the same be denied and dismissed.
DATED this &' _ day of /lkX,j

, 2004
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

MICHAEL E. DYER, Atto/pfey for Respondents
Trimco Moulding and/or i ^ o n a u t Insurance
Company

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO
APPLICATION FOR HEARING by first-class mail, postage prepaid, this

day of

^ 2004, to:
Richard Grint
5580 Capri Drive
Murray, Utah 84123
Argonaut Insurance Company
c/o Pamela LawsorJ
P.O. Box 5836
Boise, Idaho 83705

grint answer
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
801-530-6800

RICHARD D GRINT,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER

vs.

Case No. 20040182

ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent.

Judge Dale W Sessions

THIS MATTER came before the Labor Commission for hearing pursuant to Notice of
Hearing on February 16, 2005 in Salt Lake City. Present at the hearing were Mr. Richard D.
Grint, Petitioner, pro se (without an attorney), and the Respondent was represented by Michael
Dyer, Esq.
The ALJ took testimony and listened to arguments of Counsel. Mr. Dyer had not filed
the medical record exhibit because he believed that the matter should be resolve as a matter of
law on the legal theory advanced by him. The ALJ requested that the medical record exhibit be
filed and a copy provided to Petitioner. On or about February 17, 2005 the medical exhibit was
filed with the Labor Commission. The evidentiary record for the hearing was then closed.
This case presents some very unique issues and has an extraordinary history. The
medical record exhibit exceeds approximately 600 pages.
THE ALJ having first held a hearing on the matter, being advised in the premises and
having reviewed the records and exhibits before the Labor Commission now enters
FINDINGS OF FACT
as follows:
1. Petitioner was injured within the scope and course of his employment by industrial
accident on July 23, 1983.
2. Petitioner has established both medical and legal causation in satisfaction of the
requirements of Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). This is not
disputed by any party.
3. Petitioner was loading a flat-bed truck with lumber. He pulled upward on a tie-down
rope which snapped under the pressure. Petitionei fell backward from the truck bed
to the ground a distance of approximately 5 or 6 feet. Petitioner extended his arm out
to cushion the fall. When he hit the ground, hand first, his elbow broke.
4. Petitioner was earning $14.00 per hour and working 20 hours per week. However see
paragraph 18 below regarding a math error on the compensation agreement which
invalidates $55.00 per week as his average weekly rate and his compensation rate.
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5. Petitioner had a spouse and 2 children who were dependents at that time.
6. During 1985 Petitioner entered into a Compensation Agreement with the Labor
Commission approval and he received benefits:
7. In the intervening years, Petitioner has undergone 39 surgical procedures on his elbow
related to the industrial accident. They are detailed in the medical exhibit which is
incorporated by this reference as if set forth in full here. There is no dispute as to the
extent of the medical records or treatment received.
8. Petitioner's testimony is un-rebutted that he took a conservative approach to the
treatment(s) that he allowed. One primary motivation he expressed was that at the
time of the injury he was told that perhaps he would have one opportunity to have an
elbow replacement during his life. He hoped that technology would improve over
time and that he would be better off to wait and see. During the waiting period, he
took the opportunity to have conservative treatments until he had no real option but
seek the elbow replacement.
9. Respondent has paid medical benefits of nearly $300,000.00 to date. Petitioner
established at the hearing that there may be one medical bill which was not paid. He
agreed to submit it to Mr. Dyer for review.
10.lt is undisputed that the medical expenses and/or costs in this case are and will be paid
by Respondent.
11 .Petitioner has recently graduated from the University of Utah with a bachelor's degree
in Computer Systems and Petitioner is now seeking employment in that field. It is
undisputed that Petitioner at this time is not seeking permanent total disability
compensation and that we proceed on the amended application for hearing which
advances only the issue of increased impairment in permanent partial disability at a
rate higher than the original rate.
12.The Medical Record Exhibit was intentionally not submitted by Counsel at or before
the hearing on the Application for Hearing erroneously based upon the size of the
record, the lack of certain disputes and the fact that Respondent's Counsel believed
that the matter would be disposed of on a legal basis rather than a factual one.
13. Over time, Petitioner's physical condition has worsened. It is now uncontroverted
that Petitioner's impairment rating is 44% whole person as stated on the Summary of
Medical Record submitted with the Application for Hearing. This is a material
increase over the previous determination that the impairment rating is 14% whole
person. In part, the increase of the impairment rating is due to the bad result of the
surgery done in April 2002.
14.The previous orders in this case as related to the compensation that this Petitioner
should receive are inadequate and unfair to the Petitioner. Petitioner has attempted
conservative treatment which ultimately failed and he was left with a final
replacement surgery which ended in a bad result. His impairment is now more
significant than before.
15.Petitioner was making progress with conservative medical protocol until he had no
choice. Then, it is unfortunate that the surgery anticipated to help him actually
caused him more severe injury and limited use of his hand and forearm.
16.Respondents stipulated at hearing that if his medical bills are related to his arm, they
are going to pay them.
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17.Petitioner was approximately 24 years old when the accident occurred. He was in
good health. To this day he appears before the Commission with extraordinary
motivation and intellect and no other adverse health issues but those of his industrial
accident. At the time of his injury, he was earning wages at a rate higher than the
state average weekly rate. It is reasonable to conclude and I so find that over this
length of time he would have been earning the state maximum rate for Temporary
Total Disability compensation as well as Permanent Partial Disability compensation.
18. A careful review of the Compensation Agreement in this case shows that at the time it
was prepared, inaccurate information was used or a mathematical error occurred
which should be adjusted and corrected. The compensation agreement (Exhibit #1)
was inadequate and unfair to Petitioner from the outset. Both the average weekly rate
and the computation rate were in error.
THE ALJ having first entered findings of fact, now enters
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
in this matter as follows:
19.

Stoker v. The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah and the Industrial
Commission for the State of Utah, 889 P.2d 409 (Utah 1994) establishes that "[i]t
would be ironic for the Act to be construed in such a fashion that a worker who
undertakes a conservative course of therapy within the time allowed by the statute,
which if effective would save the Fund money and be less risky to the worker, would
be denied benefits when that course proves ineffective and a more aggressive therapy
must then be pursued, resulting in temporary total disability that occurs outside the
eight-year period. Had the more aggressive therapy been undertaken at the time of the
less aggressive therapy, Stoker would have met the requirements for additional total
disability benefits."
The Court then notes that in the Stoker case, the Plaintiff experienced a period of
temporary total disability related to his industrial accident while employed more than
8 years after his industrial accident. Then the Court requires that Plaintiff be put to his
proof before the Industrial Commission to prove that any continuing problem is
reasonably related to his industrial accident.
The Court then quotes the statute, recognizing that the "Commission has
continuing jurisdiction to modify its prior award [citing 35-1-78 now re-numbered as
34A-2-420] and reminding the Commission that it has no power to change the statute
of limitations.
The rationale of the Court in Stoker may amount to a conflict within the statute.
However, this ALJ takes the view that the Court was clarifying the limitation of the
statute making certain that the Labor Commission cannot change the statute of
limitations, but remains empowered to adjust the prior orders of the Labor
Commission when necessary.
20.
In the present case, there is no attempt to adjust the statute of limitations.
However, the ALJ believes that in the interest of the injured applicant, a remedy is
available and with prudent exercise of the powers vested in the Labor Commission by
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the legislature, adjusting the prior order which was inadequate, unfair and erroneous
from the outset. The mathematical errors contained thereon should be corrected in
this Order. In addition, Utah Code Ann., S34A-2-409(4) permits the ALJ to adjust
the wages for increase over time where appropriate.
21. Avis v. Board of Review (Industrial Commission), 837 P.2d 584 (UT Ct.App. 1992)
discusses the applicability of the 3 year statute of limitations for filing the initial claim
under code §35-1-99. Significantly, the Court states that "[Discretion is granted to
the Commission's application of the law to particular facts only when 'there is a grant
of discretion to the agency concerning the language in question, either expressly made
in the statute or implied from the statutory language.'" Stokes v. Board of Review, 832
P.2d 56 (Utah 1992) (quoting Morton Intl. Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State
Tax Comm % 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991) other citations omitted.
An important discussion is found in footnote 2 of that opinion. There the Court
states "A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary
partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total
disability benefits is wholly barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the
commission within six years after the date of the accident.
In the case at bar, Petitioner succeeded in obtaining an approved compensation
agreement within approximately 2 years of the date of the accident. No one has
disputed the timeliness of the filing of the Application for Hearing.
THE ALJ having entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, now enters the
ORDER
of the Labor Commission as follows:
22.Petitioner is awarded increased permanent partial disability compensation in the
amount as computed using a 44% whole person impairment rating for a period of 312
weeks from November 3, 2003 the date he stabilized at the 44% whole person
impairment. Petitioner's compensation rate is $207.00 per week (the statutory
maximum rate).
23.Petitioner is awarded increased temporary total disability compensation at the rate of
$300.00 per week (the statutory maximum rate) from April 2, 2002 (date of surgery)
to November 20, 2003 (date of stabilization). Further, Petitioner is awarded
temporary total disability compensation at the corrected amount of $202.00 from the
date of injury July 23, 1983 for 312 weeks.
24.Petitioner is awarded interest on this award at the statutory rate of 8% per annum on
all sums due under this order from the time the payments should have been made
until actually paid.
25.Petitioner has no attorney and no attorney fee is awarded.
26.Petitioner's medical bills are to be paid promptly when submitted by the treating
physician, by Petitioner himself or by his counsel so long as they relate to the injury
of his elbow. Disputes (if any) as to the payment thereof should be submitted to the
Labor Commission under a formal and new Application for Hearing to resolve the
dispute.
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27.Respondent is granted an offset of the amounts previously paid as permanent partial
disability and temporary total disability compensation.
DATED March 23, 2005.

\~

Dale W Sessions
Administrative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on February 17, 2005, to the
persons/parties at the following addresses:
Richard D Grint
5580 Capri Dr
Murray UT 84123
Argonaut Insurance Company
P O Box 5836
Boise ID 83705
Michael Dyer Esq
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111
UTAH LABOR CO^MISSJP
si—-—"

y*

S

""

/

^'-

Clerk; Adjudication Division
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615

DOC

Richard R. Burke #6843
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
648 East 100 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-1700
Facsimile: (801) 532-1780

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

RICHARD D. GRINT,
Petitioner,

]
)
])

]
)
TRIMCO MOLDING and/or ARGONAUT,;
INSURANCE COMPANY,
;)

AFFIDAVIT OF
RICHARD D. GRINT

vs.

Respondents.

Case No. 20040182
Judge Dale W. Sessions

]

Richard D. Grint, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
1.

I am over eighteen years of age, and have personal knowledge of the contents of this
affidavit.

2.

On 7/22/1983,1 injured my arm in the course and scope of my employment with Trimco.

3.

During the week of my accident, I was scheduled to work 20 hours. My rate of pay was
$14.00 per hour. I put this information on my application for hearing.

4.

I was paid by check for my work at Trimco. I saved some of my paystubs from around
the time of my industrial accident. I sent these paystubs to my claims adjuster, who then
prepared a compensation agreement for me to sign. See letter of 6/5/84 to Bonnie
Rockwood, with attachments.

5.

I have never stated that I was earning $4.00 per hour at the time of my 7/22/1983

GCM-29

industrial accident.
6.

I only had one employer at the time of my industrial accident. They were called Tiimco.
Some of my paystubs also identify my employer as "Hoff Companies," and "Hoff
Companies, Inc., DBA Trimco Molding." See paystubs and payroll advance ot 5/2/1983,
attached to this affidavit.

7.

Through the State of Utah Vocational Rehabilitation, I have attended school to enable me
to find work that I can do despite my arm injuries. Through that program, I was attending
the University of Utah around the time of my last surgery, and did not earn wages
between my date of surgery on 4/23/2002 and 11/30/2003.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
County of Salt Lake )
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this /2T) day of June, 2005 by

r —1SLT" ~ ""^Notary Public """ "*
USA BALDWIN
|

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah

648Eait 100South,$uto2G0 •
SartUktOty.Utth 84102
f

MyCommWon&ffifasi
Ju*y1O,20Oa

B

I

2

0012L

6-5-84
Bonnie Bockwood
G .w . Reese Co •
13^ ^est Broadway
S.L.C., Utah
Richard Grint
Trimco Moulding
File ft 30231
7-22-83
Dear Bonnie,
As per our converstlon, here is a copy of several paychecks as you requested.
I appreciate you looking into this matter for me.
Sincerly,

Richard Grint
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THE COURT:

1

All right, this is vh, Judge

2

Sessions, we're uh, (inaudible) admission-hearing

3

number 332 (inaudible) approximately or. (inaudible;

4

matter of Richard Grint

(inaudible).

5

Male2:

Morning.

6

Male3:

Morning.

7

THE COURT:

8

Male3:

9

THE COURT:

All right.

(Inaudible).

Good.
Uh, parties, Mr. Grint is here

10

and Mr. Dryer's here (inaudible) forward

11

so, uh, let's talk about that for just a second. Mr.

12

Grint, what is it you expect to happen in this hearing

13

today?
MR. GRINT:

14

(inaudible)

Uh, the reason I'm here to begin

15

with is for a evaluation on the disability impairment

16

primarily.

17

between myself and the insurance company on whether

18

they should be liable for monies due I guess because of

19

the increased impairment.

20

medical bills. Those are the primary.

21
22
23
24

Urn, there seems to be some disagreement

THE COURT:

That and, I have some unpaid

Uh, I have a few questions about

that (inaudible). Mr. Dyer, let's hear from you.
MR. DYER:

Uh, your honor, I've talked to

Mr. Grint on a couple of occasions now, urn, most

25 1 recently yesterday, And he says that he has an uh,
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1

unpaid medical bill in the amount of, 3 think it's in

2

the amount of a hundred and eight dollars.
THE COURT:

3
4

I'll look at it again

(inaudible) two hundred and two actually.
MR. DYER:

5

Uh, ok, I mean, w e ^ e not too

6

concerned about that as long as there's some rational

7

basis for the bill, urn, I've got the most recent

8

printout.

9

two hundred and forty eight thousand seven hundred nine

So far we've paid in medical expenses alone

10

dollars and eighty-three cents.

11

procedures performed on his arm than anyone, I think,

12

in the state of Utah, probably in the western United

13

States.

14

procedures on his arm.

16

I'd be inclined to agree with

that.
MR. DYER:

17
18

By my count, it's like 39 different surgical

MR. GRINT:

15

Mr. Grint's had more

And it's just enormous uh, he's

had that luck with his arm.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. DYER:

Urn.

(Inaudible).
Yea, uh, it's, and uh, and my

21

client has obviously agreed to, I think it was a

22

comp > e n s a b l e

23

Mr.

24
25

Grint

i n j u r y was

was o n l y

uh,

MR. GRINT :

V \ -> /-« "\r
J~/CIV_JV

A fi
1 1 1

-i r> n ~J
J- ZJ O O

,

uh,

at

the

lime

23?

Somethin g

like tha t

( I n a u d i b l e) .
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I was young.

1

MR. GRINT:

2f

MR. DYER:

3

THE COURT:

How old are you now MZ. Grdnt^

4

MR. GRINT:

45 .

5

THE COURT:

Ok.

6

MR. DYER:

He was a young kid.

(Inaudible).

So, I've, I've, I've looked high

7

and low frankly for any pre-existing condition because,

8

given the law in 1983, if I could find any pre-existing

9

condition, my client would be entitled to some portion

10

upon the employer's insurance fund.

And I,

11

unfortunately because he was so young, Mr. Grint was

12

healthy and I couldn't find anything wrong with him.

13

(Laughter).

14

explain it, you know, look, this is actually to his

15

benefit because of the other pre-existing condition.

16

In 1983, he actually gets paid for the pre-existing

17

condition.

18

have, he didn't wear glasses, I think he still doesn't

19

wear glasses, but he doesn't have high blood pressure,

20

doesn't have all the kind of things happen to people as

21

they get older because he was so young at the time so,

22

uh, we're stuck with accepting the client, uh, which

23

was done back in 1983.

24

guess for Mr. G r m t is that he wasn't making very much

25

money at the time, uh, so his comp rate is only 55

I mean, I looked everywhere, I tried to

But I you know, he was 23 and he didn't

The, uh, the only bad news I
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1 I dollars a week which is not a very high worker's ccmp
2

rate.

Uh, he was rated initially urn, by Dr. Johnson

3

Horn.

I think he was one of the initial treating

4

doctors although, frankly, every doctor who has any

5

expertise in upward extremity I think hasr looked at Mr.

6

Grint.

7

for the, for the court.

8

was relevant, it's enormous and I, I, but if you would

9

like to have a copy, I, trust me, I'll make you one.

I did make a copy of the medical record exhibit

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. DYER:

I didn't really see that it

(Inaudible).
(Inaudible) Right, right, and so

12

I thought that I would explain it, and if you want one,

13

uh, that's great, uh, I've collected most of them.

14

Horn rated Mr. Grint urn, in June of 1984 as having a

15

twenty four percent impairment of the upper extremity.

16

And based on that, urn,

17
18

MR. GRINT:

Uh, that comes out to 14 percent

of the whole man.

19

MR. DYER:

20

MR. GRINT:

21

MR. DYER:

14 percent, ok.
(Inaudible) rating.
That's, that's correct.

12 I

based on that they entered into a compensation

23

agreement

M

Dr.

,

And

so

(inaudible).
MR. GRINT:

Yea, I've got a copy of that

- 5 I right here.
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1
2

Um, (inaudible) copy of course, i

didn't know if you filed a civil

(inaudible))

3

MR. GRINT:

That's not, so (Inaudible).

4

MR. DYER:

So they entered into a

5

compensation agreement and made benefits at the 24

6

percent upper extremity impairment rating.

7

the temporary trouble disability benefits that paid in

8

the case up to that point. And signed by Mr. Grint and

9

Bonny Rockwood at the time was handling for the uh,

It outlined

10

carrier.

11

He's had ongoing medical treatments even up to the

12

present really.

13

additional occasions after additional procedures urn,

14

first by Dr. Martin Green III who's a specialist in

15

upper extremities and I might as well give you this

16

stuff too.

17

that I thought might be you know,

18
19

Mr. Grint had ongoing medical treatments.

And he was seen on a couple of

I made some copies of the medical records

MR. GRINT:
Green about the rating?

20

MR. DYER:

21

MR. GRINT:

22

MR. DYER:

23

MR. GRINT:

24

MR. DYER:

25

Is that the letter from Martin

Right.
I've got the original here too.
Yea. and so I iust made a

CODV.

Ok.
So, Dr. Green saw Mr. Grint in,

first in May of 1987, and he said yea, I think the 24
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percent impairment rating is still right and chey saw

2

him again in 1991 and he a bunch of other procedures

3

done on his uh, arm and this time he approved the 23

4

percent upper extremity impairment, which still

5

calculated to 14 percent all body so,

6

MR. GRINT:

no real change.

Can I say something here just

7

one second though? On this first letter from Jonathan

8

Horn, the very first rating, very last paragraph of

9

that letter.

10
11
12
13
14

THE COURT:

I (inaudible) have a copy of

that letter.
MR. DYER:

Uh, let me just give him a copy

of that impairment rating.
MR. GRINT:

(inaudible) Dr. Horn, that was

15

just the original rating on which the compensation

16

agreement was based.

17

THE COURT:

Ok, this is the only copy that I

18

have, right here, I did not make any copies. So, is it

19

possible for you to make a copy of this?

20
21
22

Male2:

First (inaudible) I need to

(inaudible) letter (inaudilbreO.
MR. GRINT:

This is the original impairment

23

rating from Jonathan Horn that talks about the 24

24

percent impairment with the upper extremity, 14 percent

25

entire (inaudible).

It's original rating.
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Male2:

1
2

second.

3
4

MR. GRINT:
shape.

(Inaudible) not in very great

I've had it for quite a few years.

5
6

(Inaudible) look at that for a

Male2:

(Inaudible) comes from.

Thau's where

this (inaudible).

7

THE COURT:

Mr. Dyer

8

MR. DYER:

I'm sure I have it in here, I, I

9
10

(inaudilbeO.

uh, probably reviewed it and just made a note not
thinking that it was.

11

THE COURT:

12

(inaudible) in 1984?

13

MR. DYER:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. DYER:

(Inaudible) repaired the

On yea.
Right.
Great.

I, uh, it's a situation

16

where he was (inaudible) and then he would have an

17

additional procedure on his arm and so he'd be unstable

18

for you know,

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. DYER:

I see.
Six weeks, they'd pay more

21

benefits and then, he's over and then he'd have yet

22

another procedure on his arm and then another procedure

23

on his arm.

24
25

MR. GRINT:

Yea, I would (knaudilbeO call

your attention to the very last paragraph in there that
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says that uh, there is arthritis set in ard tnere are

2

other things going on and there is a very good

3

possibility that in the future the disability rating

4

will go up and that's, right from the very beginning

5

they know that there was a possibility tn?t t n s is

6

going to increase.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. DYER:

9

sure I have.

Oh, ok, ok.
(Inaudible) I have, I'm pretty

Uh, and I was then going to show I think,

10

this was attached to the application right here and I

11

think this is what creates the controversy.

12

summary of medical evidence prepared by Dr. Chris

13

(inaudible) Martin.

14

THE COURT:

Yes. I remember

15

MR. GRINT:

Yea.

16

Male2:

17

MR. GRINT:

Yes.

currently treating me now.

19

Male2:

20

MR. GRINT:

That's a doctor that is

What's his name?
Chris Martin, Christopher

Martin. Now, one thing that I do need.
Male2.

23

(inaudilbeO.

Do you know who

18

21

This is

(Inaudible) is.

MR. GRINT:

I started with Dr. Jonathan Horn

24

urn, I wasn't particularly happy with the treatment that

25

I was getting from him.

The insurance company
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1

themselves actually sent me to Mark Green and T was

2

under Green's care for quite awhile and then the

3

insurance company sent me to a Don Colemar at the

4

University.

5

Male2:

Really?

6

MR. GRINT:

The insurance company did?

Yes, and then the insurance

7

company sent me to uh, Douglas Hutchinson at the

8

University and I was treated with Hutchinson for

9

probably 10 years or more easy until he kind of had a

10

major snafu and then the insurance company sent me to

11

uh, this Christensen.

12

a new rating in October of 2001, which is right here.

But, Douglas Hutchinson also did

13

THE COURT:

I may not have seen that one.

14

MR. GRINT:

And this one here is a new

15

rating that he did and the thing is with the insurance

16

company when I talked to them about this rating before,

17

it was consistently increasing uh, another thing also I

18

want to mention about all of these surgeries and I do

19

have a couple of correspondence from the some of the

20

doctors in here to back this up if you want to read it

21

but, I've had 39 or 40 surgeries something like that.

22

I've lost count.

23

it's just unbelievable.

24

such a severe injury to my elbow that they knew

25

eventually I would have to have it replaced with an

I've had so dang many of them thac
The reason for that is I had
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1

artificial elbow.

Unfortunately the technology is not

2

that great in artificial elbows.

3

don't like to do it until they absolutely have to,

4

until there is no alternative.

5

off until you are in your sixties.

6

roughly at the time, most of this was going on, they

7

felt like it was better to prolong that procedure as

8

long as possible because they knew it wouldn't last.
THE COURT:

9

Consequently, they

They prefer to put it
Me being in my 30's

Ok, hang on for just a second.

10

We're kind of verging into an area where I may want to

11

consider what you're saying is evidence and in order to

12

do that I'm gonna have to have you under oath to

13

testify.

14

MR. GRINT:

Ok.

15

THE COURT:

So, preliminarily, I'd like to

16

(inaudible) preliminarily where we are and then

17

(inaudilbeO severity.

18

MR. DYER:

And let me just, if I can, just

19

based upon the rating from Dr. Martin's obviously

20

increased, so the question is, ok, do we owe the

21

increase?

22

allowed for 8 years of obtaining permanent partial

23

impairment benefits and my client takes the view that

24

it's now beyond 8 years since 1983, you know, long

25

beyond that.

Uh, the law at the time in 1981 however,

So, urn, we recognize that there is no
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statute of limitations for a perm total cLaint, thac was

2

Meechum versus industrial commission case, it's about a

3

1987 case.

4

permanent total disability benefits in fact, he

5

recently graduated from the University of Utah uh, in 3

6

years rather than 4 years and had a 3.6 GPA.

7

thought about trying to get a, some kind of a mental

8

impairment as a pre-existing condition but the guy's

9

smart, so, he's not making a claim for perm-total the

10

only claim for indemnity benefits is for the increase

11

in impairment and unfortunately under the law, urn, he's

12

not entitled to an increase this far down the road.

13

But it is that total permanent impairment that I am

14

seeking claim for that increase in total permanent

15

impairment.

Uh, but Mr. Grint isn't claiming total

I even

16

THE COURT:

Well.

17

MR. GRINT:

Not seeking^

18

MR. DYER:

Permanent partial impairment is

19

what's it's called.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. DYER:

(Inaudible).
Uh, right, right, so uh, frankly,

22

his rate urn, at the 55 dollars per week is comp rate.

23

The increase is only worth about 4 thousand dollars.

24

It's not even something that we probably fight over

25

other than the fact that it's kind of apparent to the
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law that, that's the way it is.

2

we've paid almost two hundred thousand dolDais just in

3

medicals on the case.

4

MR. GRINT:

5

MR. DYER:

Given the fact that

Right.
You know, to fight over 4

6

thousand dollars isn't the big thing, which is again,

7

why I didn't make copies of all of the enormous medical

8

records and there's two hundred dollars that are

9

outstanding that as it relates in any way to his arm,

10

we'll pay the bill and that's no big deal.

11

amazing that with two hundred and fifty thousand

12

medicals that something more than two hundred dollars

13

hasn't slipped through the cracks but, uh, I think

14

that's really the only issue for the court to decide,

15

1, um, is there urn a legal basis for awarding an

16

increase in permanent impairment uh, 22 years after the

17

event uh, and second, do we owe the two hundred dollars

18

in medical bills and if we could look at the bill we

19

could probably stipulate on the record whether it

20

relates to his arm or not.

21

to pay it and if it relates to his, something, some

22

other body part that we probably wouldn't pay it but

23

that's, that's about all that we have I think to take

24

care of today.

Urn, it's

If it relates, we stipulate

DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188

(KtloO

Page 1
1

MR. GRINT:

When I talked to the industrial

2

commission about this impairment rating, they tpld j.e

3

over the phone that the insurance company was

4

responsible for payment.

5

THE COURT:

Why don't you hang on.

6

MR. GRINT:

On that increase so.

7

THE COURT:

Hang on just a minute.

8
9
10

Is there

anything else Mr. Dyer you think?
MR. DYER:

No, I think that's really it as

far as what is before the court for adjudication.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. DYER:

13

THE COURT:

Ok.
That's basically it.
Ok, Mr. Grint, I know that you

14

have information you're (Laughter) (Inaudible). Anxious

15

to hear about, urn, some things and I do have some

16

questions that I'd like to ask you urn, and so I'd like

17

you to be under oath to do that..
!

18

MR. GRINT:

Ok.

19

THE COURT:

If you would just raise your

20

right hand please, do you swear that the testi mony that

21

you are about to give in this procee ding is th e truth,

oo

the whol e truth, and noth ing but the trut h?'

23

MR. GRINT:

I do.

24

THE COURT:

Ok . You could j ust sit right

25

where yo u are . The record will pick you up.
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MR. GRINT:

Ok.

2

THE COURT:

Ok, I, uh, haye a /er>

3

abbreviated file in this case.

4

application for hearing

5

tell you what's here.

6

without having any medical information course, it looks

7

like nothing happened in this case but apparently,

8

there's a significant amount of things that happened.

9

Uh, I have application for hearing in the file that

10

I show that there's an

(inaudible) a little bit and
Uh, and see ho w tiidt all rGlatpc!

filed on March the first of last year.

11

MR. GRINT:

12

THE COURT:

Right.
And in that hearing, urn, you

13

weren't claiming total permanent disability.

14

marked the box.

You

15

MR. GRINT:

16

THE COURT:

Then, on the 25th of March.

17

MR. GRINT:

I think that was an error.

18

THE COURT:

(Inaudible).

19

MR. GRINT:

It was all mistaken.

20

THE COURT;

And, perm total disability was

21

Ok.

whited out.

22

MR. GRINT;

Ok.

23

THE COURT:

On t h e new a p p l i c a t i o n

24
25

assuming t h a t

what y o u ' r e

claiming r e l a t e s

to

so

I'm

that

application.
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MR. GRINT:

Right.

2

THE COURT:

The 25th. Ok

3

we're not

discussing permanent total disability.

4

MR. GRINT:

Right.

5

THE COURT:

Ok.

6

MR. GRINT:

Right, I am not permanently

7
8
9

totally disabled.
THE COURT:
recognizing that.

Ok, we appreciate your

Now there's some terms of

10

(inaudible) (Laughter). You know, the terminations but,

11

urn, so you were injured in July of 1983 and I cannot

12

determine when you first filed a claim with the

13

industrial commission except I have these uh, things

14

noted in the file.

15

filed which was the initial report of worker's injury

16

or occupational disease.

17

application form. I also have, the dates are very hard

18

for me (inaudible) I believe it says 02 the way that

19

uh, punch out date is difficult to read sometimes.

20
21
22
23

IN the year 2002, a form 123 was

MR. GRINT:

Ok,

And that was attached to your

so, what you want is a copy

then of the original.
THE COURT:

Hang on, hang on, it, the, ail

the things I have and then we'll sort it out.

24

MR. GRINT:

25

THE COURT:

Ok.
In 1995, I have a copy of your
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initial vocational assessment.

2

MR. GRINT:

I don't know wh$t that is.

3

THE COURT:

And, I have a copy of form 2 06

4

which was filed for the commission reporting a status

5

update on your condition and it's marked the original

6

report of assessment of need.

7

documents that are, that have been provided to the

8

commission. They are the only documents in the file and

9

so again, my first question is, uh, do you have in your

10

possession any other documents that indicate that prior

11

to 1995, you filed a claim for benefits with the labor

12

commission?
MR. GRINT:

13
14

originals.

Ok.

Uh, yes I do.

Let's see.

I think.

Those are the only

I have all of the

(Inaudible) right.

15

THE COURT:

(Inaudible) Mr. Grint.

16

MR. GRINT:

U, the only, I haven't seen any

17

application for hearing, the only thing that looks like

18

it's labor commissions (inaudible) on it is the

19

compensation agreement that I just gave to the court.

20

That was approved by Robert Ellisario(?) at the time

21

labor commission legal council October 30, 1985.
MR. DYER:

23
24
25

You know, I do have the originals

and I looked at them this morning.
MR. GRINT:

But I think that's the only

thing.
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MR. DYER:

And I don't know if I actually

2

brought them with m e .

3

application, the accident report that was filad with

4

the industrial commission.

5

this morning and I, honestly do not believe that

6

brought it with m e .

It was microfilm filed.

7

printed out for m e .

But I do have that.

8
9

THE COURT:

The very first

original

I actually looked sit it
I

It was

And it wouldn't surprise m e if

there was a first report of injury. I mean, the claim

10

was accepted as compensable, the benefits paid.

11

don't think there was any dispute in that regard.

12

MR. DYER:

I

Yea, I actually did look at it

13

this morning, it was uh, it was pulled up off of a

14

microfilm.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. DYER:

(inaudible).
In fact,

that's where I think

17

his copy of this, of this report came from.

18

a copy of this report on microfilm there was a copy of

19

that first initial
Male2:

20
21

referring to.

23
24
25

injury.
(Inaudible). I'm not sure what you're

You're holding up.

MR. DYER:

22

There was

This, yea, this is that comp

agreement.
THE COURT:

Ok, uh, I haven't

(inaudible).

Just so the record doesn't start getting blurred I'm
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gonna mark these.

2

MR. DYER:

It's all-good, it's all-qoodL

3

THE COURT:

Gentlemen the comp agreement,

4

the comp agreement is going to be marked exhibit number

5

1.

6

mark uh, Mr. Green's letter of 1987 as number 2.

7

I'm going to mark Mr. Green's 1991 letter as exhibit

8

number 3.

9

into the record?

And then, while I'm marking things, I'm going to
Uh,

Is there any objection to me receiving these

10

MR. DYER:

None.

11

MR. GRINT:

No.

12

THE COURT:

Ok, they are received and the

13

record shows that.

Uh, let's see, while we're also

14

doing that, it's already in the file but I'm going to

15

formally accept in my the summary of medical records

16

for Dr. Martin and it's number 4. (Inaudible) number

17

for the case; is there any objection to receiving that?

18

MR. DYER:

None.

19

MR. GRINT:

No.

20

THE COURT:

Ok, those 4 documents are

21

received.

22

what: we're abouc to discuss, Mr. Grint, is the

23

application of the law.

24

All right, then, uh, I, uh I believe that

MR. GRINT:

Umhm.

THE COURT:
Investigating through here there
25 I
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was a statute of limitations which,

2

compensation to be concluded within 8 year?.

3

subsequently been modified but, under tne teim thac

4

existed at the time of your injury, the law the applied

5

is that 8 statute of limitations.

6

looking to you, I, I've seen your response to his

7

pleading and you set out the statute and.

8

MR. DYER:

9

THE COURT:

Urn, so, Mr. Dyer, by

I can see clearly what you're

argument is there.

11

want to add to your responses?
MR. DYER:

That has

Yep.

10

12

(inaudible)

Uh, do you have anything that you

No, I think that you're right,

13

while it has been modified since that time, but, we're

14

kind of, stuck with the law at the time of the injury

15

and so urn, you know, we've discussed settlement, we've

16 i tried to you know, tried to discuss settlement, it's
17

mostly medical question, the impairment being

18

relatively minor given his rate.

19

obviously concerned about future medical expenses given

20

that (inaudible) number that have been performed

21

already.

22

gee, after 39 or 40 procedures and he, now has had the

23

artificial urn, elbow replacement that it's not likely

24

we're gonna have a repeat of all the stuff that we've

25

already paid for so far which is about two hundred and

Urn, Mr. Grint's

My client is uh, understandably thinking that
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fifty thousand dollars so, we, we've baen kind of

2

looking in a relatively modest range uh, you know, less

3

than 6 figures to settle this case and Mr. Grint is

4

concerned and he's thinking more about a half a million

5

dollars to settle the case and we're, that's Kind of

6

far enough apart that, that, no, we're just figuring

7

that we'll just take our chances you know, we'll see

8

what happens to him and, and, with any luck, he won't

9

even repeat the 3 9 procedures that he's had already and

10

that would be a lot less than that in the future.

Uh,

11

maybe he'll have bad luck and he'll have 3 9 more

12

procedures but you know, probably not.

13

why we have viewed the future potential exposure for

14

medical expenses uh, at a range at far less than does

15

Mr. Grint and you know, I guess my client is entitled

16

to its view on that, Mr. Grint is entitled to his, uh,

17

but, we haven't been able to bridge that difference in

18

order to reach a settlement and so I think this is a

19

case where we'll just keep medicals open and whatever

20

happens,

21

uh, but given the state of the law at the time, I, I,

22

unless the change, the plan changes to permanent total

23

disability, and for that, I, I acknowledge that there's

24

no statue of limitations at the time in 1983.

25

I think his claim for ongoing indemnity benefits is

And so that's

happens and hopefully it won't be bad.

Urn,

Uh, then
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otherwise foreclosed.
THE COURT:

2

All right Mr. Grint.

Uh, I know

3

you're proceeding without council but you 3till nave

4

the still have the same burden in terms of bringing any

5

information to me that you want me to consider that

6

rebuts Mr. Dyer's argument or helps me just find some

7

reason to disregard the statute of limitations imposed

8

by the legislature in 1983 at the time of your

9

accident.

10

me to do

Do you know of any such law that would allow
so?
MR. GRINT:

11

Well, personally I don't know of

12

any such law but, the reason I'm here to begin with was

13

because when this impairment rating was increased,

14

based off the information that I was given at the time

15

my original impairment rating was done, I was told at

16

that time that should this rating increase in the

17

future, then I would be compensated for the increase.

18

I was told at that time that there wasn't a time limit.

19

Now, I talked.

20
21
22

THE COURT:

You were told all of this by

MR. GRINT:

The insurance adjuster's CW

whom?

23

Reese that was in charge of the case at the time,

24

acting for Argonaut Insurance Company.

25

THE COURT:

You showed me a document earlier
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but I didn't receive it into the record.

2

that it was your only original copy and I don't have ^

3

copy machine here. But is that the document that you

4

were referring to that changes your impairment rating?
MR. GRINT:

5

You indicated

This is the original impairment

6

rating that was done and it indicates on here that the

7

impairment rating will probably increase in the future.
THE COURT:

8
9

And so it was speculating that

(inaudible) in the future it'd bring.
MR. GRINT:

Right, and that's what it was

12

THE COURT:

That's typical

13

MR. GRINT:

Right.

14

THE COURT:

(Inaudible).

15

MR. GRINT:

10
11

16

saying,

When this impairment rating

increased.

17

THE COURT:

Which was wnen?

18

MR. GRINT:

Urn, well it's actually been

19

increasing throughout the years and through my

20

conversations with the insurance company, and they're

21

various representatives, I was told I would be better

22

off to wait until we've reached some stable point

23

before an impairment rating was done.

24

THE COURT:

Ok, so when, when do you, what

2 5 J can you show me that indicates when, you did reach some
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1

sort of stabilization and the impairment rr_ting

2

changed?
MR. GRINT:

3

The biggest stable impairment

4

rating where they finally said ok, this is where we

5

believe you're not going to get any better was in 2001,

6

October, and that was done by Douglas Hutchinson, Dr.

7

Douglas Hutchinson at the University of Utah who had

8

been treating me for the prior 10 years.

9

increased my impairment rating at that particular time,

And he

10

let me pull that letter real quick and I'll give you a

11

copy of that, up to the 22 percent of the whole person,

12

then, this was October 30th, of 2001, and then the

13

decision was made in April of 2002 to go ahead and do

14

an artificial elbow replacement and so that was done.

15

Unfortunately there were some things done during that

16

procedure that basically crippled my right arm.

17

was some nerves that were damaged and caused me to

18

actually lose the entire use of my right hand.

19

caused my impairment to go up dramatically and that's

20

where this other impairment from Dr. Martin come in.

21

And that's when I left Douglas Hutchinson and went over

22

to Dr. Christopher Martina and that was also on

23

recommendation of the insurance company.

24

some mistakes made during that surgery that with nerves

25

that.

There

That

There were

Basically I've lost all of the feeling down
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I have no feeling at all in my hand anymore so

1

here.

2

that' s why the impairment rating then again jumped

3

within 1 year from 22 to 44 percent so.

4
5

Male2:

statute of limitations

6
7

Aren't

MR. GRINT:

(inaudible) times

(inaudible)

(inaudible) damage?
Throughout all of the surgeries,

I have had parts taken out of both legs twice.

8

Male2:

9

MR. GRINT:

Ok.
To rebuild my elbow.

I've got

10

scars that go from my hips to my knees where I've had

11

parts taken out to rebuild them.

12

to say before, the reason I had so many surgeries was

13

because the technology in an artificial is not that

14

great. They don't replace any more than a hundred or

15

two hundred a year throughout the United States.

16

Like I was starting

THE COURT:

I need, I need to ask you a

18

MR. GRINT:

Ok.

19

THE COURT:

(Inaudible) too far away from I

17

question.

20

needed to know. You indicated that you lost feeling in

21

at least part of your right hand correct?

22

MR. GRINT:

Yes.

23

THE COURT:

And you lost (inaudible).

24

MR. GRINT:

Yes .

25 1

THE COURT:

To use it?

J
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3

MR. GRINT:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Ok.

MR. GRINT:

In a normal nand, you can take

And,

4

and spread your fingers out and move them, in my right

5

hand, this is what I can do.

6

can move.

7

that's it.

8

right wrist tied, my hand did one of these claw things.

9

And it was stuck there permanent, that was it.

That's the only finger I

I can move my thumb great.

My right hand,

I have had to have all of the tendons in my

They

10

had to go in up here, which is what Dr. Christopher

11

Martin did, move all the tendons and tie them together

12

and in my wrist in here and in my hand up in here, had

13

moved the muscles so that the muscles in my forearm

14

actually make it so I can bend my fingers now whether

15

than all the intrinsic muscles that are in your hand.

16

All of these intrinsic muscles that give you all the

17

flexation in your fingers are dead.

18

down and control them don't op<3rate anymo re. They are

19

actually severed right here so they no lo nger exist.

20

could take my finger and I could cut them off and I

21

would never feel it.

22 1

dea.d

23

called a still-li ght injection which I have to do once

24

a week where they go in through my throat with a needle

25

and th ey inject a nerve block into the sp inal cord

The nerves that go

I

You know, they are completely

Uiri, because of: that now I alscD hav e what's
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1

right where that nerve comes out and starts down

2

through the shoulder and down to the arm and that's to

3

block the pain down there.

4

procedure that they do that kind of replaces that

5

that's supposed to rather than have this done once a

6

week, it's supposed to increase it to once every 3

7

months where they actually go in with two needles into

8

the same place and they like burn that nerve.
THE COURT:

9
10

There is a?so another

And how often did you say that

they have to do that procedure?
MR. GRINT:

11

It's either once

a week or once

12

every three months depending on which procedure they

13

do.

14

THE COURT:

15

frequency procedure.

16

MR. GRINT:

17

I think that's the radio

Yea, I's the radio frequency

that's supposed to last every three weeks.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. GRINT:

Three months.
Or every three months, yea.

The

20

problem with the radio frequency is it's only about 80

21

percent effective where the other one's a hundred

>2

percent effective.

>3
>4
!5

THE COURT:

But this is ongoing now forever.
And the insurance company is

paying for that correct?
MR. GRINT:

It's great fun, I'm sure, at a
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1

thousand bucks a week.
MR. DYER:

2
3
4

Well, I don't think it'3 that

expensive.
MR. GRINT:

(Laughter)

Well, the still

5

lights are a thousand bucks a week, the other one's,

6

I'm not exactly sure what the other one is, but,

7

they're awfully expensive and they're awfully painful.

8
9
10

THE COURT:

(Inaudible) don't have general

anesthesia for the procedure or?
MR. GRINT:

They do a anesthesia for the

11

radio frequency one, which is, you know, where they

12

actually go in and burn the nerve.

13

on the urge of a sleep.

14

because you have to talk while they do it because that

15

particular nerve bundle that comes out of the spinal

16

cord also controls your breathing and it also controls

17

your speech and that if they get the wrong nerve, you

18

can go into I guess repertory arrest, so and, they can

19

also burn the one that makes you talk, so they got to

20

make sure that they're at the right one.

21

I was saying with all of these surgeries, you know,

22

they've taken parts out of my legs to rry to rebuild

23

the elbow, all of this was an attempt to prolong the

24

process of putting in the artificial elbow because I

25

was told originally it could only be done once.

They put you right

They can't have you asleep

Anyway, like

Once
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1

it's done, it's done, there's nothing alse that can be

2

done, when it wears out the only option left is to fuse

3

the arm. That would mean losing all motion, I'd bv3

4

stuck in a permanent whatever.

5

position I chose, that's where I'd be stuck at.

6

consequently, they wanted to put it off as long as

7

possible.

8

to maybe 2 or 3 times maximum but because they don't do

9

that particular procedure very often, there's no

You know, whatever
So,

I'd been told since then that it's possible

10

research done into it; the technology behind the parts

11

is not that great, you know, it's not hips and knees

12

where they do thousands and thousand of them every

13

year.

14

put the money into it.

15

great.

16
17

They only do a couple of hundred so they don't

So,
THE COURT:

All right, Mr. Dyer, question to

you.

18

MR. DYER:

19

THE COURT:

20

So the technology isn't that

Yes.
Cause I don't have a medical

record cause I don't.

21

MR. DYER:

22

THE COURT:

I apologize for that, but I.
It's ok, I judge cases on, based

23

on the past so.

24

mentioned before earlier that Mr. Grint's probably seen

25

everybody in town?

Uh, have you had, has there, you
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MR. DYER:

Well yes, you look at h-s ljst

2

and I mean, it includes every specialist I think for

3

upper extremities.

4

interested.

5

THE COURT:

I could read down to you «f you're

No, no, not at this moment, but,

6

thank you, is there, have you, has the insurance

7

company ever requested uh, an IMV(?)?

8

MR. DYER:

9

THE COURT:

10

Oh yea.
And is there a competing

impairment issue?

11

MR. DYER:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. DYER:

The.
(Inaudible) feeling.
The, the last I meeting(?), was

14

done by a doctor just before he had his uh, elbow

15

replacement surgery, the artificial elbow.

16

MR. GRINT:

17

MR. DYER:

18

MR. GRINT:

19

MR. DYER:

What's an IME?
Independent Medical Evaluation.
Ok.
And, so we sent to another IME

20

say, really, does, this, is this a really good idea?

21

And the IME doctor said yea, for him it is.

22

why they then said ok and paid for it.

23
24
25

THE COURT:

Which is

Ok, did he do an impairment

rating?
MR. DYER:

He didn't.

He said,

I can't do
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an impairment rating because if I do, the uh, u?h,

2

surgery to do the elbow replacement that it may, that

3

we have to wait and see how he does from the surgery

4

before we could get into another impairment rating_.
MR. GRINT:

5

They've never disputed the

6

impairment rating or sent me to anybody for an

7

impairment rating.

8

for other opinion regarding surgeries.

They have sent all over the place

9

THE COURT:

(Inaudible).

10

MR. GRINT:

So, now.

11

THE COURT:

(Inaudible) directly to do

12

though, just kind of though, well, let me tell what my

13

thinking is at his moment.

14

of law.

Uh, there's a (inaudible)

15

MR. GRINT:

Right.

16

THE COURT:

I have, I have to determine if

17

there is a legal basis for a departure from the clear

18

statute that was in effect at the time of your injury,

19

now, that may ultimately bar you from any recovery and

20

it may stop anything further in your case except

21

ongoing medical.

22

haven't brought me one, to uh, circumvent that

23

argument, then, then the issue is, what evidence do I

24

receive and how can I be sure that the impairment

25

rating is correct?

Now, uh, if there is a basis, but you

And, uh, from what I'm seeing, your
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3

MR. GRINT:

Uhuh.

4

THE COURT:

Uh, Mr. Dyer's saying that we've

5

had it evaluated along the way for medical

6

reasonableness but we've n^ver had an impairm

7

rating.

8

MR. DYER:

9

THE COURT:

It's true.
And so, uh, the impairment

10

rating may be an issue to consider by (inaudible) the

11

case.

12

MR. GRINT:

I can show, I do have some

13

letters in here from the doctors that show that the

14

impairment has been increasing and will probably

15

continue to get worse.

%S

THE COURT:

Uh.

M

MR. GRINT:

But, you know, I don't know if

18

you want to see that.
THE COURT:

20

(inaudible), but yea, that would

(inaudilbeO.

21

MR. GRINT:

But what I do.

22

THE COURT:

All you've brought me is, you

23

brought me this Dr. Martin'£•

24

MR. GRINT:

Final impairment rating.

25

THE COURT:

That was given the final
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impairment rating.
MR. GRINT:

2

Yea, now what I did, when this

3

impairment come out, I called the industrial commission

4

and I asked them about it.

5

company liable for this increase?^

6

don't know, we will have to look into it and see__.

7

they researched it and they called me back and they's

8

told me yes, they were liable for it.

9

called the insurance company and I told the insurance

10

I says, __is the insursnce
And they says, _I
And

And then, I

company.

11

THE COURT:

(Inaudible) additional increase?

12

MR. GRINT:

Uh, I do not know exactly who it

13

was who did the initial research and I don't have their

14

names written down.

15

THE COURT:

And where was it at?

16

MR. GRINT:

It was just, I called the number

17

in the phone book for the industrial commission for the

L8

accidents and talked to one of the girls that answered

19

the phone and.

20
>1

THE COURT:

Obviously there's some

difficulty in me accepting what you're saying.

12

MR. GRINT:

Yea.

>3

THE COURT:

Uh.

14

MR. GRINT:

I can realize that and she

!5 I talked to somebody else and they called me back and
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1

they said yes, that they're responsible for it and I

2

called the insurance company and talked to them and

3

they said no we're not so I called the industrial

4

commission back and I says this is what the insurance

5

company says, there is an eight year deal and ?he says

6

well, I will look into it again and this time I talked

7

to a different person.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

THE COURT:

Is that when you filed your

application for hearing?
MR. GRINT:

Yes.

That would be the person

that sent all of the information out to me.
THE COURT:

Ok.

(Inaudible) you acknowledge

that (inaudible) pre dates the event.
MR. GRINT:

This particular person, again,

15

went back and researched it, and told me again that

16

they were liable for it and I says, well the insurance

17

company tells me that they're not and she says flat out

18

they are, I've got it right here.

19

THE COURT:

Well, let me assure you that if

20

there was an employee acting like that at the labor

21

commission they would be summarily dismissed.

22

providing legal advice and it's against the law.

23
24

MR. GRINT:

That is

Urn, that's, that is exactly what

they told me and she said that the only way that you're

25 I going solve this is to file a hearing.
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THE COURT:

Ok.

2

MR. GRINT:

That's why I filed ic.

3

THE COURT:

The advise that you received to

4

file an application for hearing is fair game, the rest

5

of it is not important for my consideration.

6

verify that, I can't go back and take care of it.
MR. GRINT:

7

I can't

What I did was then once the

8

hearing was filed, I called them back again and I have

9

the name written down but in my mass of paperwork I

10

would know exactly where to start looking, just tell

11

you exactly who it was that I talked to but I do have

12 : it.

I said send me a copy of that so that I've got it

13

so that when I walk in the room I don't look like an

14

idiot, you know, so I have a copy of that record so

15

that I can show it to them and I never did get it.

16

that, that was what I was told from the industrial

17

commission from the people that I talked to was that

18

there was no statute in effect at that time. They told

19

me that the law changed in 1986, I believe it was, to 8

20

years.

21

that.

22

They said in 1983, there was no statute on
On that, for that partial disability, that.
MR. DYER-

Well, that, that might apply to

23

perm total cases.

24

limitations on perm totals but,

25

So,

In 1988 they put it, statute of

MR. GRINT:

And that's what I was told.

And
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that's why we're here.
THE COURT:

2

Ok, well the issue i^,

3

(inaudible) uh, to determine if there's a legai basis

4

for increasing the impairment rating recognition.

5

if there is, then, uh, you maybe entitled to some lorm

6

of compensation and in some amount that will have to be

7

determined.

8

provide a copy of whatever bill that you think is

9

outstanding

z^nd

Uh, I uh, I uh, would encourage you to

(inaudible) relates to your arm.

10

MR. GRINT:

11

THE COURT:

Umhm.
To Mr. Dyer so that he could

12

discuss that with his client.

13

it, uh, inside of this litigation, you can ask me to

14

rule on whether that should be paid or not.
MR. DYER:

15

If they decline to pay

My understand is that he's

16

actually paid the bill already, so, yes, it's actually

17

been paid, we just need to reimburse Mr. Grint but, I,

18

we need to get the bill just to know what it was that

19

was done..

20

THE COURT:

It's almost as if

(inaudible)

21

not necessary to do it inside the proceeding, but if

22

you're alleging that something is unpaid then, at

23

least, that's a matter of course..

24

it to Mr. Dyer as long as the matter is pending so that

25

he can discuss it with his client.

You have to provide
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MR. GRINT:

2

THE COURT:

Umhm.
My experience has besn they've

3

made the determination very quickly about wnether or

4

not they're going to pay it.

5

that you think needs to come out of this hearing Mr.

6

Grint?
MR. GRINT:

7

Is there anything else

Uh, I think that pretty much

8

covers it.

The only thing is that, you know, they knew

9

that this increase has been going on consistently

10

throughout that period of time.

11

areas where I was deliberately misled on time

12

restraints by the insurance company where I had to go

13

in and fight otherwise where I found out information

14

from them otherwise which might have been an

15

contributing factor here also.

16

know, if there was an 8 year time frame that they were

17

aware of, I think they were far less than truthful in

18

coming out and saying that otherwise, I would have had

19

an impairment rating done then.

20

wouldn't have been questionable because I was under

21

treatment at the time and it was ongoing and

22

consistent.

23

an impairment rating done.

24

sense.

25

Uh, I've had other

I don't think, you

You know, that

There's no reason why I wouldn't nave had
That wouldn't have made any

You know, so,
THE COURT:

Mr. Dyer has asked if I had the
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medical

record.

2

MR. G R I N T :

3

MR. DYER:

4

Oh ok, that's rot a problem.
Uh, the only reason I've made a

couple of the pages of.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. DYER:

I understand.
what people have made ratings u h ,

7

I mean, Dr. Green did his rating in 1991 which was 8

8

years later that essentially agreed with what had b e e n

9

paid back in 1985 b u t , I, I, whatever y o u want, that's

10

fine.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. DYER:

13

THE COURT:

I'd

like to ask you to do that.

Sure.
And then, as far as the hearing

14

is concerned, as soon, unless there is, is there

15

anything else you want me to consider or to know about

16

(inaudible).

17

MR. GRINT:

Urn, I think that pretty much

18

covers it, you know, other than, you know,

19

impairment rating now is very significant.

20

really affects everything that I do.

21

alls I can tell you is just, what I've been told

22

through my conversations with the industrial

23

so, and I haven't actually gotten anything in copy

24

them.

25

the
And it's,

Urn, you know,

commission
from

So,
THE COURT:

Mr. Dyer, is there anything

else
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you want me to consider on the recorc?

2

MR. DYER:

No, I think that that's a 3 1 .

3

THE COURT:

Closing the medical, I'm

closing

4

the record on the case this, the subject (inaudible).

5

Please.

6

MR. DYER:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. DYER:

It may take uh, couple of days.

9

THE COURT:

You're all right. (Inaudible).

10

MR. DYER:

Uh, would you like a copy?

11

MR. GRINT:

12

MR. DYER:

13

may, all right.

14

though.

Sure.
Uh, with that, I.

Of the medical records?

Uh, the copy of this, uh, you

This is only the University of Utah's

15

THE COURT:

16

(Many voices at the same t i m e ) .

17

MR. GRINT:

18

21
22

MR. DYER:

Yea, might as well, yea.

I

I could make you one, I, you

know.
THE COURT:

(Inaudible) you know.

That's

just disorganized and.

23

MR. DYER:

24

THE COURT:

25

You're entitled to (inaudible).

would.

19
20

From?

Not a problem.
Such, it maybe that it has

contains something significant that will affect my
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judgment.

Uh, it may not.

(InaudilbeO dscide afcer I

2

have a look at it but Mr. Grint, you'll at least be

3

able to see what is supplied and_

4

MR. GRINT:

Umhm.

5

THE COURT:

customary (inaudible) you would

6

have a copy of what

(inaudible) labor commission.

7

MR. GRINT:

Sure.

8

THE COURT:

Urn, Mr. Dyer are you interested

9

in submitting any kind of written summation of the law

10

from your position?

11

MR. DYER:

Uh, you know, if there's any

12

doubt, uh, I mean, I have a copy of the statute, I've,

13

I'd probably refer to the statute uh, I probably refer

14

to the statute and say, here's what it says and I think

15

it's pretty clear.

16

statute. I assume that the commission has copies of

17

those older statutes and you can take a look at them,

18

but, I, I brought a copy in case you want to look at

19

it.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. DYER:

Urn, if, it's kind of an old

(Inaudible) review

(inaudible).

So you probably have everything

22

that I would otherwise bring to your attention.

23

don't know what else I could do other than to show you

24

what the statute says.

25

THE COURT:

Ok.

I

Well I think I can handle
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that too.

(Inaudible) this case.

2

future look like Mr. Grint

3

current condition and how it's going to ba developing

4

over time?
MR. GRINT:

5

What does your

where dp you perceive your

Well like he, li'ker hd < told you,

6

I just graduated from the University of Utah urn, the

7

state, voc rehab actually paid for all of my schooling,

8

tuition, books and all that.

9

of this injury, I was in the construction business for

So, I have been, because

10

quite a number of years and am no longer able to do any

11

of that type of work.

12
13

THE COURT:

Are you talking about manual

labor?

-•.-";

14

MR. GRINT:

0: • - —

15

THE COURT:

Cau;ve Zbere

16

in construction tha~

17

(inaudible) probably suxLui)Iu.

18

MR. GRINT:

Well, any

' . -.

are a ?.ot of areas

-'*..-«

' T'

that involves

19

lifting anything over 5 or 10 pounds, and I'm riuht

20

handed and where I've lost the use of my right hana now

21

makes that very, very difficult.

O^ o.£.
•

handed person.

I am not a left-

As much as I tried over the years, just

23

becoming a lefty is tough.

24

happens with, I got to have another surgery here I knov/

25

So, depending on what

fairly quickly where they're going to go in and try to
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1

move that nerve and get rid.
THE COURT:

2

3

(Inaudible) moving what nervs

sir?
MR. GRINT:

4

Well, right where the nerve ends

5

in my elbow, there is an aroma that's formed which is

6

like a little round ballish whatever, it's very hyper

7

sensitive. Alls, alls it takes is just a little teeny

8

little brush and it, kinda like, you ever been hit

9

the funny bone?

m

That's what my arm feels like all the

10

time.

Right there.

11

that.

And make it so that it's, at least I won't be on

12

all the narcotics and the pain medications that I'm on

13

all the time now because I am on percocets and other

14

things just to control the pain right now.

15

hopefully that will cut those down.

16
17
18

THE COURT:

And hopefully that will eliminate

Has that been, Mr Dyer, are you

aware of the (inaudible) on that procedure
MR. DYER:

So

(inaudilbeO?

Yea, I think it's, correct me if

19

I'm wrong, I think it's an alter nerve transposition

20

that they want to do which is just to put the nerve

21

an area where it's not as exposed to outside bumps.

22

MR. GRINT:

23

MR. DYER:

m

Yep.
Urn, that happens, urn, with some

24

regularity urn, with you know, cubital tunnel, uh, with

25

(inaudible) problems with the nerve coming down through
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1

the elbow given the number of surgeries that he's had

2

and I haven't looked at each one, I ^m kir«da surprised

3

that they haven't done that one already.

4

he needs another one, you know,

5
6
7

MR. GRINT:

But, if, if

Then on top of tne injections

that I have, you know its.
THE COURT:

(Inaudible) something

8

(inaudible).

Mr. Grint, are you (inaudible) where you

9

have, your contact with the insurance adjuster for preauthorization or what's the relationship between..

10

MR. GRINT:

11

Yes.

Insurance company.

There

12

is an insurance company called Corvelle which the

13

insurance company has sent, that goes along with me to

14

doctor appointments, things like that, that is kind of

15

a managed care type thing.

16

time to the appointments.

17

MR. DYER:

18

MR. GRINT:

They send a nurse all the

Nurse case manager?
Right, and, they basically pre-

19

authorize everything.

20

go through them, it goes to the insurance company.

21

They authorized whether or not it can be done.

22 1
23
24
25

THE COURT:

So everything that's done has to

So this new procedure that

you're contemplating, has it been approved?
MR. GRINT:

Not yet, no.

I don't know how

far along in the chain it is actually.

I know that
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1

Corvelle was aware of it.

2

know.

3

THE COURT:

Ok.

4

MR. GRINT:

So.

How far beyond it I don't

Beyond thati, you know,

5

depending on how these injections continue to go, and

6

the timing on those, the next thing to do is find a job

7

because I haven't worked since this elbow was put in.

8

THE COURT:

When was that?

9

MR. GRINT:

That was in what, April of 2002.

10

THE COURT:

Well, during that time period,

11

did you have

(inaudible)?

MR. GRINT:

12

Yes.

Well, like I said, the

13

vocational rehab paid for all of that, you know, they

14

found that my disability was severe enough that

15

retraining would be necessary for me to become

16

gainfully employed in another occupation.
THE COURT:

17
18 ! questions.

Ok, I've got some technical

I mean, kind of be very specific in

19

narrowing down what I'd like to know about your

20

condition.

21

MR. GRINT:

Ok.

22

THE COURT:

When you were injured in 1983,

23

uh, how soon after your injury did you start receiving

24

medical care?

25

MR. GRINT:

Oh, within about an hour.
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THE COURT:

1

And uh, the extent of your

2

injury at the time of the injury was complete loss,,

3

were you able to move your arm or your hand or anything

4

at that time?
MR. GRINT:

5

At the time of the injury, I had

6

a broken elbow, what I did was I fell off the back of

7

truck, just so that you know it was a, a flat bed, like

8

a pick up truck with flat bed on it that had a load of

9

lumber.

10

THE COURT:

Umhm.

11

MR. GRINT:

And we were tying down a load of

12

lumber on the back and I was pulling on a rope trying

13

to tie a load down and the rope broke and out of reflex

14

I went off the back off the back and out of reflex I

15

reached back to catch myself and dropped about, I'm

16

guessing about that high up to the pavement and stiff

17

armed to the ground.

18

it tore all of the ligaments in my wrist and broke my

19

elbow so I went from there right to the emergency room.

And just pushed everything up and

20
21

THE COURT:

Ok, so, after that point, uh,

22

did you regain any use of your arm or is it then

23

continuously the same loss as the injury?

24
25

MR. GRINT:

It's been continuously the same

loss ever since. I don't think that there has been a
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time period of more than 6 months that I haven't

oeen

2

in the doctor since.

3

THE COURT:

Ok.

4

MR. GRINT:

And that was kind of why I

5

brought this particular medical record with me just

6

because it shows ongoing and his medical records will

7

also show the same thing that every couple of months,

8

it is ongoing into the doctor's office continuously u p

9

through current.
THE COURT:

10

Do you know why if, if what

11

just said is true, that it's been the same loss as

12

motion, same loss of use, same loss of everything

13

your initial injury, that you're impairment rating

14

changed?
MR. GRINT:

15
16

rephrase that.

18

was

Well, ok, let me, let me

Well, what do you mean by it,

because I asked you a direct question.
MR. GRINT:

19

since

What do you mean by the same loss of?

THE COURT:

17

you

I asked y o u .

Ok, originally, I had a loss of

20

motion.

21

with my hand originally.

22

when I had the artificial elbow put in did I lose the

23

use of my hand.

24
25

My hand worked fine.

THE COURT:
was the other

There was nothing

wrong

Ok, not for, not until

2002,

Ok, hang on just a second.

That

(inaudible)?
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MR. GRINT:

Yes.

2

THE COURT:

Ok, go ahead.

3

MR. GRINT:

So I think I might have

4

misunderstood what you meant by that.

Ok, so, after

5

the original injury I'd lost motion and a^ time

6

progressed,

7

worse and worse as time went on.

8

got worse.

9

the very beginning n o .

10

what you were reading.

I continually lost more motion.

It became

A n d it continually

So, it wasn't the same as it is now from
I think I just

misunderstood

11

THE COURT:

Ok.

12

MR. GRINT:

A s far as actual problems, you

13

know, I've had problems continually since then.

14

THE COURT:

Ok.

15

MR. GRINT:

Since then.

16

THE COURT:

17
18

I've read about your

condition

so.
MR. GRINT:

So

the condition since the very

19

beginning has continuously gotten worse and worse and

20

worse and worse and worse until they put th s artificial

21

elbow in, when they did that, that's when I lost all of

22

the feeling in my ha nd.

23

surgeries because or that where they had to some other

24

things , my condition hasn' t changed since •

25

ongoing just treatin g what they can,

There itfere bhree
1
more

It' s been

just trying t o
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1 I keep the pain down now since then.
2 I

THE COURT:

Did you pursue any claim against
You said one of

3

the doctor of the surgery?

4

you that they had messed it up but I was just< curious.

5

MR. GRINT:

them cold

The problem that nappeiied with

6

the surgery was that the doctor accidentally stitched

7

around the older nerve when they were sewing things

8

back up.

9

piece about that long and actually caused it to die.

And when he did it, he happened to kill a

10

Now, when he did it, I immediately lost feeling to my

11

hand.

12

of the recovery room,

13

feeling back in my hand and I knew it, I knew that

14

there was a problem and I told them there was a problem

15

and I said that there's something wrong there.

16

other surgeries, that other nerve has gotten tied up in

17

scar tissue and actually gotten pinched and I had

18

problems with feeling to where the feeling would start

19

to decrease and my hand would start to shrivel up, you

20

know, your older (?) nerve is being pinched.

21

go in and move and then I had to have a surgery where

I mean, right during surgery, when you come out
and that, I never got the

22 I they'd go in there and release it.

I've,

We got to

And I had that

23

exact same thing and I told them, I knew there was a

24

problem in there and it just so happens that when the

25 I cast came off from that surgery, I had a hematoma right_
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and that's what they were told and consequently, you

2

know, they sent it up to another doctor, tne

3

because of the way the notes are actually written, the

4

surgical notes, they read the surgical notes and the

5

doctor doesn't come right out and say weir I stitched

6

the nerve and killed it, the doctor says we found

7

sutchers in and about the area.
MR. DYER:

8

file, and

That's that.

Almost seems like a Ray Simpson

to me, you go in to have elbow surgery and you don't

9

10

normally expect to come out with a hand that has loss

11

of feeling, I don't know.

12

MR. GRINT:

13

MR. DYER:

14

No.
I'm not a malpractice guy, I was

just curious if there was anything (inaudible) so.
MR. GRINT:

15
16

could.

17

no.

You know, I definitely wish I

If I could find somebody that would do it, but,

But i t happened.

18

MR. DYER:

19

limitations on that one too.
MR. GRINT:

20
21

There's probably a statute of

Oh, there's a big statute on

that one.

22

MR. DYER:

23

MR. GRINT:

24

MR. DYER:

25

MR. GRINT:

(inaudible).
(Inaudible).
I think it's two years for.
Yep it is, two years.

But, you
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know, that's, that's what happened there.
THE COURT:

2
3

What medications are you

currently taking?
MR. GRINT:

I take Zongram(?),, everyday, I

6

THE COURT:

What's that for?

7

MR. GRINT:

Percocet, it's for the nerves.

8

THE COURT:

Nerves?

9

MR. GRINT:

Uhuh.

4
5

take .

10

which is also for the nerves.

11

what else?

12

right now.

I take Amitriptoline(?),
I take Percocet.

That's it right now.

And

Just those three

13

THE COURT:

And you're having the injection?

14

MR. GRINT:

Yes.

15

THE COURT:

(Inaudible).

16

MR. GRINT:

Uh, the last one I had was a,

17

urn, one of those that lasts for like three months so I

18

had to have one done in quite a while.

19

have the authorization to go in and redo it, so, as

20

soon as I call them and make an appointment

21

(inaudible).

22

MR. DYER:

However, I do

Radio frequency next week.

23

frequency. It's pretty experimental actually.

24

lot of companies don't approve them but, the only

25

Radio

And a

reason that we've approved on him is because it seems
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to help so I think that they.
THE COURT:

2
3

Because they're, already started

that kind of intervention.
MR. GRINT:

4

It's been going on now for what,

5

a year and a half.

6

almost as painful as the injury.
MR. DYER:

7

Those are not fun.

Those are

Well, the literature I've read

8

says that it's supposed to actually increase the pain

9

for the first 5 to 7 days and then it's supposed to

10

give long, long term relief for up to 3 months, 3 to 4

11

months.

12

It's kind of a burning of the nerve.
MR. GRINT:

Yes.

The initial trauma that

13

causes the increase in pain but then after the initial

14

trauma goes away, then the deadening of the nerve

15

effect continues for 3 to 4 months. So it's a, worst

16

part is getting the needle stuck through your throat.

17

MR. DYER:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. DYER:

21

THE COURT:

23
24
25

Mr. Dyer, do you have any

questions based on our (inaudible).

20

22

It's a long road, process.

I don't.
I know that this is somewhat

informal but.
MR. DYER:

It has been and, but I think that

it's appropriate for this case.
THE COURT:

(Inaudible).

Mr. Grint, do you
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have any questions or anything you want to follow up.
MR. GRINT:

2

No, I think we've pxetity aiuch

3

covered it all.

So far so, I can't think of anything

4

else. You know of, if the law says that they're not

5

responsible for it, then that's the way it is.

6

know, pretty much.

7

I'm here because I was told that they were and my

8

feeling is that this has progressed over time; they

9

knew it was progressing over time and I was lead to

You

So, whatever you decide, I mean,

10

believe that time wasn't an issue, you know, or I would

11

have had it done now, so.
THE COURT:

12

I did analyze the comp agreement

13

Mr. Dyer (inaudible).

14

(inaudible) did that, is that, was that the statutory

15

maximum?

16

MR. DYER:

You might know the answer

Oh, heaven's no.

I think, I

17

think it was a statutory minimum, in other words, uh, I

18

think that his average weekly wage was only 60 dollars

19

a week and so, his comp rate was 55 which I think was

20

the minimum, it's not two thirds, he was, he uh, uh,

21

got almost the full wage.

22

THE COURT:

And for, I don't, I haven't got

23

the (inaudible) uh, the number of weeks that was

24

inclusive other than (inaudible) year and a half.

25

(Inaudible).
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MR. DYER:

1

And we've paid more benefits than

2

this over the years too.

3

done.
MR. GRINT:

4
5

Cause he had more procedures

Over the years, I thin': I put

that in my answers.
THE COURT:

6

You did.

I think it's

7

(inaudible).

8

but you're obviously entitled to (inaudible) at best if

9

that were increased and awarded.

10

But (inaudible) since the big

(inaudible)

I don't see it in

your response.
MR. DYER:

11

Well in the, in the answer on

12

page 2, paragraph 3, paid a total of 1490785 an

13

indemnity and that included the 24 percent upper

14

extremity of 24 (inaudible).

15

injury, did you have children or were you married, is

16

that the idea?

17

MR. GRINT:

18

MR. DYER:

At the time of your

Yes.
Oh, ok.

Cause the minimum was 4 5

19

and it (inaudible) payments so he must have had two

20

dependents at the time.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. GRINT:

What's that?

23

THE COURT:

You were married with two

24
25

How about that Mr. Grint?

children?
MR. GRINT:
Yes.
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THE COURT:

That's (inaudible).

2

appreciate your having the hearing

3

information to work with.

4
5

MR. DYER:

(inaudible)

And I'll get this over to you.

(Inaudible) exhibits.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. DYER:

8

THE COURT:

9

formal mediation in this case.

10

Well ok, I

MR. DYER:

(Inaudible).
Ok.
At this point,

(inaudible)

(Inaudible).

Well, we could certainly try,

11

that's not, it's not out of what we'd like to do. I

12

think my client would be more than anxious to settle

13

the case. It's, it's just hard at, from 1983 to 2005,

14

we paid two hundred and fifty thousand dollars to then

15

say, from here forward it's gonna be half a million.

16

(Inaudible) almost to the point where we t m n k gee,

17

we've done almost everything.

18

elbow replacement, maybe they need to do it even two or

19

three times but I think the cost of that to the

20

hospital is like twenty something thousand dollars.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. DYER:

23

THE COURT:

Maybe he needs another

Just for the hospital though.
For the hospital.
Did you know about how much it

24

was, the total for the elbow replacement Mr. Grint?

25

Ballpark unit?
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MR. GRINT:

1

just the hospital itself, the

2

bill tftat X have v*as twenty seven ^kcusaria, yist the

3

hospital bill, that doesn't include the doctor, the

4

anesthesiologist, the medications and physical therapy

5

and all that stuff that goes with it.

6

looking at being 4 5 years old right now, where I come

7

up with my figure that he's talking about is, I look at

8

a thousand dollars a week for these injections that I'm

9

having done, which, I realize the insurance company

3o, and I am

10

doesn't quite have to pay that or, roughly 5 thousand

11

dollars every three months for this radio frequency

12

shot that has to be done.

13

approximately another 3 0 years, for the rest of my

14

life, the medications that I'm on are approximately a

15

hundred and sixty dollars a month.

16

that I know that are upcoming, the artificial elbow is,

17

has a life expectancy of 10 years maximum.

18

know, there's a possibility of two more of those plus,

19

what happens when that is gone?

20

40's, by the time I'm GO years old, I can end up with a

21

fused arm.

If you consider that for

Urn, the surgeries

So, you

You know, being in my

What is your degree in?

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. GRINT:

Computer information systems.

24

THE COURT:

Bachelor's of Science?

25

MR. GRINT:

Yep-
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3

THE COURT:

Are you actively looking for

employment?
MR. GRINT:

Yes.

I don't hava it on now but

4

normally I wear a brace too to protect my arm.

5

a brace that goes from about here to her3 and.

6

THE COURT:

I have

I understand that you have

7

arrived at what you think this case is worth and so

8

(inaudible).

9

MR. GRINT:

Now, again, that's where I come

10

up with this million and I realized you know that that

11

would be a little silly.

12

going to pay that.

13

THE COURT:

I realize that they're not

You know.
(inaudible) my question is, uh,

14

sometimes I've had success letting the parties mediate

15

at this stage provided that you're willing to do that.

16

MR. GRINT:

17

THE COURT:

Umhm.
If you are so far apart that

18

there is no purpose in certainly doing that, then, urn,

19

(inaudibl<2) worth the exercise.

20

allow you to if you chose while.

21

MR. DYER:

22

MR. GRINT :

It would cer tainly

It doesn't cost anything.
No, and it 's fine with me too.

23

You know, I'm more than reasonabl e with that. You know,

24

like I said, I come up with a million dollars by adding

25

all those tog ether.

That's where I come up with that.
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Now I know for a fact that that's not whac they re

2

gonna pay.

3

coming up with the five hundred thousand chat I

4

suggested to him and even that, it's probably a little

5

bit out of hand.

6

than willing to any offer that they're willing to out

7

there. What they need to understand is that, I know

8

what's coming up.

9

be expected.

And I don't expect then to.

And tbat s

And I'm not unreasonacle so, I'm more

And I know what's probably going to

I would just assume leave the file open

10

rather than take a chance on not getting the care that

11

I need in the future.

12

to put myself in a situation that is going to be

13

harmful to me in the future.

14

right now like that.

15

I would have settled it a long time ago.

16

assume.
MR. DYER:

17

You know, because, I'm not going

I don't need the money

You know, if that were the case,
So, I just

That's why it kinda seemed like a

18

case just leave it open and we'll pay for it as it

19

comes.

20

MR. GRINT:

But at the same time, you know,

21

if they want to make an offer and take it off the

22

books, you know, that's ok, they've they got their

23

administrative costs, and other things that are going

24

along with it.

25

added up a lot of the bills that I have and I, I've

So, you know, I've gone through and
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1

only got just a small percentage of the iaills and my

2

figures obviously aren't going to match theirs but I'm

3

at three hundred thousand.

4

only pay a percentage.

5

guess, and keeps them and we just only pay the every

6

(inaudible).

So, then I know that they

He gets the grcss bills, I

And there are bunches that I don't have.

7

No, I did not used to get copies of the hospital bills

8

and that in the very beginning so I don't have all that

9

and it isn't until just the last maybe seven

or eight

10

years that the hospital has actually sent it, started

11

sending copies to the patients.

12

bills that I don't have, plus, I don't have all the

13

bills from the doctors they sent me to for a second

14

opinions and that type of thing.

15

are bunches that I don't have.

16

out of pocket, should I settle are going to be

17

significantly higher than I think what they've paid.

18

You know.

19

THE COURT:

So, there's a lot of

You know.

So I know that my costs

Re direction your questions to

20

you Mr. Dyer about any competing impairment

21

information.

22

So there

(Inaudible).

MR. DYER:

I have not. Uh, ac the time that

23

he had the surgery, I mean, it was twenty years post

24

injury and I think that carry, this went so far beyond

25

the years that we don't care, set up a IME to have him
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1

evaluated and it's like, why?

2

comes in at 44, or, 36, or some other number.

3

what's the point, you know, it's like information that

4

doesn't make any difference at this point so they

5

didn't set up an IME meeting either and look at it.

6

THE COURT:

7

ongoing jurisdiction

8

MR. DYER:

Uh, you kxiow, suppose it
Uh,

How do you feel about the
(inaudible)?
I'd go on jurisdiction,

9

obviously, allows us to be here, that's why we're here.

10

Uh, but the limitation is pretty much a limitation that

11

says, you have a certain amount of time in which to

12

collect benefits for certain types of injuries.

13

have permanent total disability, there's no apparent,

14

uh, there's no limit.

15

Meechum case, they said no, there's no limit, but on

16

other types of benefits, there are limits, medicals

17

obviously, there's no limit.

18

denied.

19

you agree all the time with what the legislature does,

20

you know, I have a hard time asking people certain

21

things because you know, when you could talk about pre

22

existing conditions, you don't know how many times in

23

the past that I've had to ask ladies, you know, have

24

you ever had a hysterectomy and they look at me like

25

what does that have to do with anything?

If you

Uh, and that was subject of the

And that's not been

Urn, and so, you know, it's one of those, do

And I say
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well, trust me, it goes to pre existing conditions and,

2

and you know, a lot of people disagree with whether or

3

not you should have (inaudible) that pay^ pre existing

4

conditions and a portion of that, I've gotten to the

5

point where uh, you know, I follow thia is vvhat the law

6

is,

7

there are so many competing interests that go into

8

creating it, boy that's no fooling. Yea, no, I'm

9

telling you, that's just the way it is and so since the

I mean, if you try to understand it, and, you know

10

law has different competing interests and, it's

11

creating, I'm to the point where I don't second guess,

12

I just look at it and say, well that's how it was then,

13

it's morphed to something different now and uh, all I

14

can do is say that on a permanent impairment, that's

15

the way it was at the time.
THE COURT:

16

All right, thank you gentlemen

17

and appreciate your comments and your participation and

18

(inaudi ble) uh,

19

decide that i[tiediation would be f:ruitful, you could

20

schedul e one •

I s uppose I1 11 1 save it to you, if you

MR . DYER:

21

Ok. . I' 11 check with my client

22 1

because they maybe they'd like a number that the

23

mediator might give •

24

MR . GRINT

25

MR . DYER:

Yea.
Because it ' c; kind o f a morphus
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thing right now because obviously they've paid s. lot,

2

but, you know, there's more to go.
THE COURT:

3

So as long as you're willing to

4

participate in that in good faith, I'd encourage you to

5

do that.

6

you get from that possibility than from me, I don't

7

know.

That's, might be happier with the result that

8

MR. DYER:

9

THE COURT:

10

Yep.
But as least if you're open, urn,

to the concept, I'll leave it to you.

11

MR. GRINT:

Well, I'm open to it.

12

THE COURT:

I'll wait until I've got

13

the

medical record probably to.

14

MR. DYER:

15

THE COURT:

Review whatever you consider.
Whatever's in there, unless, urn,

16

what I'd like you to do Mr. Dyer is urn, is there

17

(inaudible) copies yet.

18

MR. DYER:

19

THE COURT:

Ok.
Just

give

me a

few d a y s

to

20

settle on, you know, on some of the issues that I think

21

that are important then I'll, cause I (inaudigleO that.

22 1

MR. DYER:

Well, it, it, well my thought,

23

it's a legal issue more than a medical issue.

24

was why I thought, you know, I can make it's, GOO

And that j

25 i hundred some odd pages and maLybe the judge will want to
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1

read all 600 pages but I think it's a legal issue.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. DYER:

Yea, I understand.
With medical undercones and, and.

4

we've never really denied medical, and if we get this

5

two hundred dollar bill, then ok.

6

MR. GRINT:

I think the biggest thing that

7

the medical record is going to show is just that there

8

was ongoing treatment on an consistent basis, every

9

month, month after month after month, month after

10

month, year after year with no break, you know.

11

THE COURT:

12

to just sort of work that out.

13

office.

14
15
16

MR. DYER:

(Inaudible), give me a few days

Ok, sure.

And I'll contact your

If you head back early

(inaudible) just send it to me.
MR. GRINT:

I will show you what I have.

17

As soon as we get done here because I don't have

18

original, as in the very first bill, but I have

19

subsequent statements, says was balance.

20

MR. DYER:

(Inaudible) refer back to

21

whatever it was that they did.

22

MR. GRINT:

And then the correspondence for

23

the doctor that you're a bunch of nuts, how come you

24

didn't pay this? (Laughter)

25

MR. DYER:

That type of thing.

Well, (inaudible).

Case where a
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1

guy had an injury and part of the medical record or,

2

(inaudible) for his wife hysterectomy.

3

MR. GRINT:

4

MR. DYER:

5

(Inaudible) you know, ^e don't

take bets (inaudible).

6

MR. GRINT:

7

MR. DYER:

8

THE COURT:

9

Oh good.

I know.
So,
Ok,

they

just

thank

needed

you,

we'll

(inaudible).
be off

record.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH
I

)
r

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:

ss.

)

j

I, Chris Alder, do hereby certify:

I

That I am a Certified Court Transcriber of
Tape Recorded Court Proceedings/ that I received
electronically recorded tapes of the within matter and
have transcribed the same into typewriting, and the
foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 64, inclusive, to
the best of my ability constitute a full, true and
correct transcription, except where it is indicated the
Tape Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible.

j
I

I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of
either party, or otherwise interested in the event of
this suit.

j

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 9th day
of June, 2 0 05.

cjL^ilh^
j
Chris Alder
DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188
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MICHAEL E. DYER, [A3786]
SHARON J. EBLEN, [5832]
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC
Attorneys for Respondents
257 East 200 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT84111
Telephone: (801)521-7900

THE LABOR COMMISSION
STATE OF UTAH

Richard D. Grint,

REPLY MEMORANDUM
Petitioner,

vs.
Trimco Molding and/or Argonaut
Insurance Company,
Respondents.

Case No. 2004-0182

Judge Dale W. Sessions

Respondents, Trimco Molding and/or Argonaut Insurance Company, by and
through their attorney(s), Michael E. Dyer and Sharon J. Eblen, of Blackburn & Stoll.
LC, file this REPLY MEMORANDUM in the above referenced matter.
1.
The Petitioner was injured by accident in the course and scope of his
employment with Respondents on July 23, 1983. Accordingly, the provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act in effect on that date apply to his claim. The Petitioner's
Application for Hearing seeks payment of additional temporary total disability (TTD) and
permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation. Respondents' Answer to the
Application for Hearing raises the eight year statutes of limitations under Utah Code
§35-1-99, as well as the eight year maximum periods to receive temporary total
disability (TTD) and permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation contained in Utah
Code §§35-1-65 (1981 Amendment) and 35-1-66 (1983 Amendment).
2.
The Petitioner asserts that the Utah Supreme Court's analysis in Vigos v.
Mountain Land Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, applies in this matter. Respondents assert
that while that case may apply to the application of Utah Code §35-1-99, the Vigos
decision does not address or apply to the 8 year limitation provisions of Utah Code
§§35-1-65 and 35-1-66. The plain language of those statutory provisions bars claims
for additional benefits that occur more than eight years after the date of the Industrial
Accident.
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3.

Utah Code §35-1-65 (1) ((1981 Amendment) provided in relevant part:
"In no case shall such compensation benefits exceed 312
weeks at the rate of 100% of the State's average weekly
wage at the time of the injury over a period o* eight years
from the date of the injury." Exhibit A. Utah Code §35-1-66
(1983 Amendment) provided: "The Commission may make
a permanent partial disability award at any time prior to eight
years after the date of injury to an employee whose physical
condition resulting from such injury is not finally healed and
fixed eight years after the date of injury and who files an
application for such purpose prior to the expiration of such
eight year period." Exhibit B.

4.
Accordingly, the Respondents in this matter assert that the plain language
of the statute bars the Petitioner's claim for additional temporary total disability (TTD)
and permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation pursuant to the Application for
Hearing that was filed by him on March 5, 2004, almost 21 years after the date of his
accident. Respondents request that the Commissioner reverse the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order issued by Judge Sessions because the Order does not
comply with the clear language of the statute in effect on the date of the Petitioner's
July 23, 1983 industrial accident.
Dated this

day of July, 2005.
Respectfully submitted,
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

Sharon J. Eblen
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REPLY MEMORANDUM
Page 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of REPLY MEMORANDUM was mailed,
first class, postage prepaid on the &t&*^~ day of July, 2005 to:
Richard R. Burke
King, Burke & Schaap
648 East 100 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Argonaut Insurance Company
Attn: Brian Heaton
7272 East Indian School Road, Suite 209
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251
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insured workers determined by dividing the total insured workers reported for the preceding
year by twelve The average annual wage thus obtained shaU be divided by 52, and the average
weekly wage thus determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state a\erage weekly wage
as so determined shall be used as the basis for computing the maximum compensation rate for
injuries or disabilities arising from occupational disease which occurred during the twelvemonth period commencing July 1 following the June 1 determination, and any death resulting
therefrom
[Effective May 13, 1975-May 9, 1977.]
* 1977 Amendment*
35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of payments — State average weekly wage defined.
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee shall receive 66%% of that employee's average
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such disability is total, but not more than a
maximum of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not
less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent
minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor
children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but
not to exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. In no
case shall such compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury over a period of eight years from the date of the
injury.
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to in Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be
determined by the commission as follows: on or before June 1 of each year, the total wages
reported on contribution reports to the department of employment security under the
commission for the preceding calendar year shall be divided by the average monthly number of
insured workers determined by dividing the total insured workers reported for the preceding
year by twelve The average annual wage thus obtained shall be divided by 52, and the average
weekly wage thus determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state average weekly wage
as so determined shall be used as the basis for computing the maximum compensation rate for
injuries or disabilities arising from occupational disease which occurred during the twelvemonth period commencing July 1 following the June 1 determination, and any death resulting
therefrom.
[Effective May 10, 1977-May 11, 1981.]
*1981 Amendment*
35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of payments — State average weekly wage defined.
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee shall receive 66%% of that employee's average
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such disability is total, but not more than a
maximum of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not
less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent
child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent children, not to
exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed
100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. In no case shall such
compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage
at the time of the injury over a period of eight years from the date of the injury.
In the event a light duty medical release is obtained prior to the employee reaching a
fixed state of recovery, and when no such light duty employment is available to the employee
71
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from the employer, temporary disability benefits shall continue to be paid.
The "state average weekly wage" as referred to \u Chapteis 1 and 7 of this title shall be
determined by the commission as follows: on or beibre June 1 of each year, the total wages
reported on contribution reports to the department of employment security under the
commission for the preceding calendar year shall be divided by the average monthly number of
insured workers determined by dividing the total insured workers reported for the preceding
year by twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall be divided by 52, and the average
weekly wage thus determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state average weekly wage
as so determined shall be used as the basis for computing the maximum compensation rate for
injuries or disabilities arising from occupational disease which occurred during the twelvemonth period commencing July 1 following the June 1 determination, and any death resulting
therefrom.
[Effective May 12, 1981-present.]
(2)

35-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability — Amount of payments.
Where the injury causes temporary partial disability for work, the employee shall receive, during
such disability for not to exceed 312 weeks over a period of not to exceed eight years from the date
of the injury, compensation equal to 66%% of the difference between that employee's average weekly
wages before the accident and the weekly wages that employee is able to earn thereafter, but not
more than a maximum of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of injury per week and
in addition thereto $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18
years, up to a maximum of four such dependent children, but not to exceed 100% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of injury per week.
The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for work at any time prior
to eight years after the date of the injury to an employee whose physical condition resulting from such
injury is not finally healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury and who files an application
for such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year period.
In no case shall the weekly payments continue after the disability ends or the death of the injured
employee.
[Effective May 12, 1981-June30, 1988]
*1988 Amendment*
35-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability — Amount of payments.
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability for work, the employee shall receive weekly
compensation equal to:
(a) 66%% of the difference between the employee's average weekly wages before the
accident and the weekly wages the employee is able to earn after the accident, but not
more than 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of injury; plus
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up
to a maximum of four such dependent children, but only up to a total weekly
compensation that does not exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of injury.
(2) The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for work at any time prior
to eight years after the date of the injury to an employee:
(a) whose physical condition resulting from the injury is not finally healed and fixed eight
years after the date of injury; and
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*1983 Amendment*
35-1-66, Permanent partial disability — Scale of payments.
The commission may make a permanent partial disaoiFty award ai any time prior to eight years
after the date of injury to an employee whose physical condition resulting from such injury is not
finally healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury and who files an application for such
purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year period.
In no case shall the weekly payments continue after the disability ends, or the death of the
injured person.
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 66%% of that employee's
average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 66%% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week
plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent children, but not to exceed 66%% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week, to be paid weekly for the number of weeks stated against
such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition to the compensation provided for temporary total
disability and temporary partial disability, to wit:
For the loss of:
Number ofWeeks
(A) Upper extremity
(1) Arm
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter amputation)
218
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid insertion
187
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and elbow joint, at elbow joint,
or below elbow joint proximal to insertion of biceps tendon
178
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal to insertion of biceps tendon
168
(2) Hand
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or midmetacarpal amputation
168
(b) Allfingersexcept thumb at metacarpophalangeal joints
101
(3) Thumb
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of carpometacarpal bone
67
(b) At interphalangeal joint
50
(4) Index finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
42
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
34
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
18
(5) Middle finger
(a) At metacajpophaJangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
34
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
27
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
15
(6) Ring finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
17
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
13
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
8
(7) Little finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
8
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
6
98

(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
4
(B) Lower extremity
(1) Leg
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis)
156
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less below tuberosity of ischium
125
(c) Leg above knee with functional stump, at kne^ joint o** Gritti-Stokes
amputation or below knee with short stump (three inches or less
below intercondylar notch)
112
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump
88
(2) Foot
(a) Foot at ankle
88
(b) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's)
66
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation
44
(3) Toes
(a) Great toe
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone
26
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint
16
(Hi) At interphalangeal joint
12
(b) Lesser toe (2nd - 5th)
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone
4
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint
3
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal joint
2
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint
1
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints
26
(4) Miscellaneous
(a) One eye by enucleation
120
(b) Total blindness of one eye
100
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing
100
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to loss of the member. Partial
loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the complete loss or loss of use of the
member. This paragraph, however, shall not apply to the items listed in (B) (4).
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and paid as follows:
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in decibels with frequencies
of 500, 1000, 2000 and 3000 cycles per second (cps) using pure tone air conduction audiometric
instruments (ANSI 1969) approved by nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement
of hearing impairment. Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies above 3000 cycles per second shall
not be considered in determining compensable disability. If the average decibel loss at 500, 1000,
2000, and 3000 cycles per second is 25 decibels or less, usually no hearing impairment exists.
"Presbycusis" is defined as hearing loss common to persons of advanced age and is considered
to be due to general environment rather than industrial conditions.
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medical and paramedical professionals appointed
by the commission shall measure the loss in each ear at the four frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, and
3000 cycles per second which shall be added together and divided by four to determine the average
decibel loss. To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear, the average decibel loss for
each decibel of loss exceeding 25 decibels shall be multiplied by V/2% up to the maximum of 100%
99
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which is reached at 92 decibels.
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage cf heanpg loss in the better
ear by five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss in fhe poorer <?ar anc frviahg by six. The
resulting figure is the percentage of binaural hearing los^. Compensation for permanent partial
disability for binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the percentage of binaural
hearing loss by 100 weeks of compensation benefits as provided in this chapter. Where an employee
files one or more claims for hearing loss the percentage of hearing5 loss previously found to exist shall
be deducted from any subsequent award by the commission. In no event snail compensation benefits
be paid for total or 100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 100 weeks of compensation benefits.
For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily function not otherwise provided for herein,
such period of compensation as the commission shall deem equitable and in proportion as near as may
be to compensation for specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this section but not exceeding in
any case 312 weeks, which shall be considered the period of compensation for permanent total loss
of bodily function.
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations as to the maximum weekly
amount payable as specified in this section, and in no event shall more than a maximum of 66%% of
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be
required to be paid.
[Effective May 10, 1983-June30, 1988.]
* 1988 Amendment*
35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of payments.
An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an industrial accident and
whofilesan application for hearing under Section 35-1-99 may receive a permanent partial disability
award from the commission.
Weekly payments may not in any case continue after the disability ends, or the death of the
injured person.
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 66%% of that employee's
average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 66%% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week
plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent children, but not to exceed 66%% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week, to be paid weekly for the number of weeks stated against
such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition to the compenseition provided for temporary total
disability and temporary partial disability, to wit:
For the loss of:
Number ofWeeks
(A) Upper extremity
(1) Arm
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter amputation)
218
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid insertion
187
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and elbow joint, at elbow joint,
or below elbow joint proximal to insertion of biceps tendon
178
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal to insertion of biceps tendon
168
(2) Hand
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or midmetacarpal amputation
168
(b) Allfingersexcept thumb at metacarpophalangeal joints
101
100

0V209

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
RICHARD D. GRINT,
Petitioner,
ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

vs.
TRIMCO MOULDING and
ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY,

Case No. 04-0182

Respondents.

Trimco Moulding and its insurance carrier, Argonaut Insurance Company (referred to jointly
as "Trimco" hereafter), ask the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge
Sessions' award of benefits to Richard D Grint under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the
Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-12 and Utah Code Ann §34A-2-801(3)
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Mr. Grint injured his right elbow while working for Trimco on July 22, 1983. Trimco
accepted liability for the injury under Utah's workers' compensation system and paid Mr. Grint's
medical expenses, as well as temporary total and permanent partial disability compensation.
In an application filed on March 1, 2004, and amended on March 25, 2004, Mr. Grint sought
additional medical and disability benefits for the injuries he had suffered in the 1983 accident. Judge
Sessions held an evidentiary hearing on February 16, 2005, at which time Mr. Grint explicitly
narrowed his claim to additional permanent partial disability compensation and medical expenses
On March 23, 2005, Judge Sessions issued his decision Despite the limited scope of issues
Mr. Grint had identified at the evidentiary hearing, Judge Sessions 1) retroactively increased the rate
of Mr. Grint's temporary total and permanent partial disability compensation, 2) awarded temporary
total disability compensation at the increased rate from July 23, 1983, for 312 weeks, 3) awarded
additional permanent partial disability compensation at the increased rate for Mr Grint's current
impairment rating, 4) awarded interest on all unpaid disability compensation, and 5) ordered Trimco
to pay Mr Grint's medical expenses.
Trimco now asks the Commission to review Judge Sessions' decision Specifically, Trimco
asserts that Judge Sessions erred by addressing issues not raised by Mr Grint and by awarding
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additional permanent partial disability compensation l Trimco also argues Mr. Grint's claim should be
remanded to Judge Sessions to determine whether liability for Mr. Grint's benefits should be
apportioned between Trimco and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund.

DISCUSSION
Adjudication of issues not raised by Mr Grint. In Hilton Hotel v. Industrial Commission, 897
P.2d 352, 356 (Utah App. 1995), and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 847 P.2d 418,
420 (Utah App. 1993), the Utah Court of Appeals struck down administrative agency decisions that
purported to adjudicate issues that had not been raised in the adjudicatory proceedings before those
agencies. The Court of Appeals based its decisions in Hilton Hotel and Chevron on the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in Combe v. Warren Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984).
There the Utah Supreme Court stated the following principle: "It is error to adjudicate issues not
raised before or during trial and unsupported by the record. The trial court is not privileged to
determine matters outside the issues of the case, and if he does, his findings will have no force or
effect."
The Commission has carefully reviewed the entire record in this matter and notes that only
two issues were submitted to Judge Sessions for decision: Mr. Grint's right to medical benefits and
his right to additional permanent partial disability compensation for an increased impairment rating.
Judge Sessions did not inform the parties that he intended to adjudicate any other issues.
Consequently, the evidence and argument presented during the hearing focused entirely on the two
issues raised by Mr. Grint. But the decision issued by Judge Sessions went beyond those two issues
to increase the rate of disability compensation, both retroactively and prospectively, and to award
additional temporary total disability compensation In light of the decisions of the Utah Court of
Appeals and Utah Supreme Court cited above, the Commission concludes it was error for Judge
Sessions to raise and decide these additional issues.2 The Commission will therefore set aside Judge
Sessions' decision on those issues.
Additional permanent partial disability compensation. While it was improper for Judge
Sessions to decide issues sua sponte, Mr. Grint did raise two issues that were actually litigated and,
therefore, properly decided by Judge Sessions The first of those issues, Mr. Grint's right to payment
of medical expenses, has been conceded by Trimco and need not be considered further. The second
1 Because the Commission finds these issues dispositive, it does not identify or address Trimco's
other arguments
2 The record in this matter illustrates the necessity of limiting decisions to those issues actually raised
during the hearing process Because no one identified compensation rate or duration of temporary
total disability as disputed issues, no evidence or argument was presented on those issues.
Consequently, when Judge Sessions addressed those issues sua sponte, he relied on incomplete
evidence and reached conclusions that may be significantly inaccurate.
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issue, Mr. Grint's right to an award of additional permanent partial disability compensation remains in
dispute.
The unfortunate circumstances regarding Mr. Grint's claim for additional permanent partial
disability compensation are as follows. On July 22, 1983, when Mr. Grint was a young man, he
injured his elbow while working for Trimco. Thereafter, for the next 20 or more years, he required
repeated surgeries on his injured elbow By 1985 he was rated as having a 14% whole person
impairment from the injury. Trimco paid him permanent partial disability compensation accordingly.
Thereafter, Mr. Grint continued to require periodic surgeries on the elbow. By November 2003,
more than 20 years after the original work accident, Mr. Grint was rated with a 44% whole person
impairment.
I
The question before the Commission is whether, this many years after Mr. Grint's accident,
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act allows the Commission to award additional permanent partial
disability compensation for Mr Grint's increased impairment rating. In considering this question, the
Commission recognizes that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act must be liberally construed in
favor of coverage and compensation. Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co. 956 P.2d 257 at 260 (Utah
1998); Burgess v. Siaperas Sand & Gravel 965 P.2d 583, 588 (Utah App. 1998). However, the
Commission must also apply the provisions of the Act according to their plain language.
At the time of Mr. Grint's accident in 1983, an injured worker's right to permanent partial
disability compensation was governed by the following Version of Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-66:3
The commission may make a permanent partial disability award at any time prior to
eight years after the date of injury to an employee whose physical condition resulting
from such injury is not finally healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury and
who files an application for such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year
period.
Despite this statutory limitation against awards of permanent partial disability compensation more
than eight years after the date of injury, Judge Sessions has awarded such compensation to Mr. Grint
nearly 22 years after the date of injury.
Mr. Grint attempts to support Judge Sessions' award by reference to the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in Vigos v. MountainlandBuilders, Inc., 993 P. 2d 207 (Utah 2000). However,
Vigos only addressed the statutory requirement that a timely application be filed and did not consider
§ 66's eight-year limitation for entry of an award Mr Grint also cites the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in Stoker v. Workers Compensation Fund, 889 P.2d 409 (Utah 1994). But Stoker
3 In 1997, the Utah Workers' Compensation Act was recodified as Title 34A, Chapter 2. The
Act's provisions for permanent partial disability compensation are now found at § 34A-2-412.
These provisions also have been substantively amended since 1983
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considered statutory provisions for temporary total disability compensation, rather than the permanent
partial disability compensation Furthermore, Mr Grint relies on dicta in the Stoker decision that
conflicts with the actual holding of the case
Finally, Mr Grint cites § 34A-2-417(2)(c) of the Act, which allows the Commission to award
compensation "a reasonable time period beyond 12 years from the date of accident " However, the
authority granted by § 417(2)(c) is specifically restricted by several conditions One of those
conditions is that within 12 years after the accident, a) a Commission-approved rehabilitation plan is
in place, but the results of such a plan are either not yet known, or b) litigation is ongoing at the
Commission Mr Grint's claim does not satisfy these preconditions Consequently, even if it is
assumed that § 417(2)(c) can be applied retroactively to Mr Grint's claim, the claim does not fall
within the parameters of § 417(2)(c)
In light of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that it cannot now award additional
permanent partial disability for Mr Grint's 1983 injury and that Judge Sessions erred in awarding
such additional compensation
As a final matter, the Commission declines to consider Trimco's argument for apportionment
of liability for Mr Grint's benefits between Trimco and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund In light of
the Commission's decision setting aside Judge Sessions' award of additional compensation, the issue
of apportionment is largely moot Furthermore, Trimco failed to either raise the issue or present
supporting evidence at the appropriate time in these proceedings
ORDER
The Commission grants Trimco's motion for review and sets aside Judge Sessions' decision
and order, except for paragraph 26, page 4, of the order, which requires Trimco to pay Mr Grint's
reasonable expenses for necessary medical treatment of his work-related elbow injury It is so
ordered
Dated this / /

day of January, 2006

Utah Labor Commissioner

IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Motion For Reviewjn the matter of
Richardd D. Grint, Case N 0 04-0182, was mailed first class postage prepaid this J9fday of January,
2006, to the following:
Richard D. Grint
5580 Capri Dr
Murray UT 84123
Argonaut Insurance Company
101 California St Ste 1150
San Francisco ID 94111
Richard Burke Esq
648 E 100 S Ste 200
Salt Lake City UT 84102
Michael Dyer Esq
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
RICHARD D. GRINT,
Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER DENYING REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION

TRIMCO MOULDING and
ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY,

Case No. 04-0182

Respondents.

Richard D. Grint asks the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its prior decision regarding
Mr. Grint's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A,
Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §63-46b-13.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
On January 17, 2006, the Labor Commission reversed Judge Sessions' award of additional
disability compensation to Mr. Grint for injuries he suffered while working for Trimco on July 22,
1983. Specifically, the Commission concluded that Judge Sessions had erred in raising and deciding
sua sponte the issues of Mr. Grint's 1) compensation rate and 2) right to additional temporary total
disability compensation. The Commission also concluded Judge Sessions had erred in awarding
additional permanent partial disability compensation to Mr. Grint.
In requesting reconsideration, Mr. Grint argues the two issues identified above were properly
presented to Judge Sessions for decision. On that basis, Mr. Grint further argues that the
Commission should evaluate the merits of those issues, taking into consideration certain
documentary evidence that Mr. Grint submitted after the evidentiary hearing.
DISCUSSION
The essential fact missing from Mr. Grint's argument is that, at the beginning of the
evidentiary hearing on his claim, Mr. Grint affirmatively stated to Judge Sessions and Trimco that
the claim was limited to permanent partial disability compensation for an increased impairment
rating. Consequently, neither party submitted evidence or argument on any other issues, nor did
Judge Sessions inquire into any other issues.
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In light of the limits Mr. Grint placed on his claim, Trimco was not required to produce
evidence on any other issues. Judge Sessions erred, not by failing to pursue other issues during the
evidentiary hearing, but in later deciding additional issues that Mr. Grint had excluded from
consideration. And because such additional issues were waived by Mr. Grint, the Commission will
not consider post-hearing evidence on those issues.
As a final point, Mr. Grint suggests that he should be allowed to reopen his claim because he
was not represented by counsel at the evidentiary hearing. However, it appears Mr. Grint chose to
represent himself at the evidentiary hearing. By all accounts, he is very capable and has substantial
past experience with the workers' compensation system. Under these circumstances, the
Commission does not consider Mr. Grint's representation of himself as a basis to reopen this
proceeding.
ORDER
The Commission reaffirms its previous decision in this matter and denies Mr. Grint's request
for reconsideration. It is so ordered.
Dated this Xo

day of February, 2006.

R. Lee Ellertson
Utah Labor Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS

Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For
Review with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Reconsideration in the
matter of Richard D Grint, Case No. 20040182, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid this ^ ^ d a y
of February, 2006, to the following:
Richard D Grint
5580 Capri Dr
Murray UT 84123
Argonaut Insurance Company
101 California St Ste 1150
San Francisco ID 94111
Richard Burke Esq
648 E 100 S Ste 200
Salt Lake City UT 84102
Michael E. Dyer
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
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